Transformações do Mundo do Trabalho: as Novas Tecnologias da Informação e Comunicação, os Investidores Institucionais e o Ativismo Sindical Acionarial

Changes in the World of Work: New Information and Communication Technologies, Pension Funds and Shareholder Activism

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Resumo: O artigo aponta para as recentes transformações do Mundo do Trabalho dando destaque ao papel das Novas Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação (NTIC) e às flexibilidades por elas proporcionadas. Destaca-se, porém, que sua difusão deve ser entendida em um contexto específico, o que exige para sua compreensão uma investigação sobre a *economia política* de sua implantação e desenvolvimento. Nessa senda, aponta-se para a paradoxal situação na qual os recursos acumulados pelos próprios trabalhadores, concentrados nos Investidores Institucionais, são os principais elementos de força que constroem um ambiente econômico e social que precariza as condições de trabalho e as bases políticas da representação de classe dos próprios trabalhadores. Por fim, o artigo aponta para a falácia dos expedientes encontrados, sobretudo pelos fundos de pensão, para mitigar os efeitos sociais daquele paradoxo: os Balanços Sociais e os Fundos Éticos.

Palavras-chave: financeirização; Novas Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação; governança corporativa; Fundos de Pensão; ativismo sindical acionarial.

Abstract: The paper deals with recent changes in the *world of work* and their relations with the emergence of New Information and Communication Technologies (NICT). It is pointed out that these transformations must be understood in a specific social and economic context that requires an investigation of the *political economy* regarding their introduction and development. In this sense, the article points to the paradoxical situation where workers' money is used in a way that hurts the very workers and their legal representatives. Finally,

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the article suggests the fallacy in adopting Social Balances and Ethical Funds as forms of mitigating the trouble caused by that central paradox.

Keywords: financialization; New Information and Communication Technologies; corporate governance; Pension Funds; shareholder activism.

Since the beginning of this decade, a growing number of researchers have investigated the mutations contemporary capitalism has undergone in both its nature and mode of operation, based on the interpretation of a process that called *financialization*.[3]

Indeed, the past decades, especially after the 1970s, have witnessed unprecedented growth in the importance of markets, institutions and financial elites, not only due to the volume of capital traded on financial markets in their ever increasing instruments, but also as a result of the dissemination of typical norms and criteria for evaluating fictitious capital to other spaces of capital valorization.

Among other phenomena, the interpretation of this process has seen the transformation of institutional forms of corporate governance, development of markets for corporate control and growth in the importance of Institutional Investors.

These transformations have dramatically affected the traditional forms of insertion of individuals into the job market, whether observed separately, or from the perspective of their class representatives. Thus, the contemporary job crisis can be interpreted as stemming from the financialization phenomenon.

In face of this hypothesis, this text is presented in five parts, besides this introduction. The second part discusses the recent transformations in the production area and their consequences in terms of transformation of the conditions that created the post-War economic and virtuous social arrangement.

Then, it shows how this new environment was in great part forged by the action of Institutional Investors, especially the pension funds. Understood by some authors as a sort of socializing myth of capitalist benefits, these agents are understood herein rather as parts

[3] Many authors in recent works have investigated the phenomenon of *financialization*. For more information on this concept, we find especially useful the contributions by Aglietta (2008), Aglietta and Breton (2001), Aglietta and Ribérioux (2005), Blair (2003), Braga (1997), Crotty (2002), Flingstein and Shin (2007), Lazonick (2008), Lazonick and O´Sullivan (2000), Lordon (2000), Paley (2007), Plihon (2005) and Sauviat (2005).

of the group of main artifices of the accumulation regime belonging to capitalism's contemporary moment. Above all, its action resulted in significant changes in the rules of capitalist corporate governance, resulting in changes of great depth in organization of the job market, aspects discussed in greater detail in the next part of this paper.

In conclusion, the text shows some of the "solutions" found by the union movement for the dilemma of, through pension funds, worker resources contributing decisively to the precarious conditions of their jobs and a political weakening of their collective representations. In this aspect, the paper discusses the tendency, through what has come to be called trade union shareholder activism, the generalized adoption of Social Balance Sheets by corporations and the directing of pension funds to Socially Responsible Investments, where investment funds known as Ethical Funds have stood out. The conclusion follows[4].

1. **Changes in the productive sector**

The constitution of collective savings on a gigantic scale is the most notable characteristic of contemporary capitalism along with the changes provided by the New Information and Communication Technologies (NICT). Understanding the changes through which the job market is going requires comprehension of these phenomena and how they upset the traditional forms of individual insertion and collective representation of workers.

The NICT that make up the Third Industrial Revolution provided capital a degree of flexibility it had never achieved before.[5]

First because the NICT made *production flexibility* possible in industrial corporations. In this sense, base micro electronic technologies revolutionized earlier Ford production forms and brought to light an arsenal of new and modern production concepts

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[4] It is important to underscore that the test seeks to capture a general movement of change from the relation between forms of management, property and control of capital and transformations of the job market, not descending to specific aspects of Brazilian reality. This shall be addressed in a future study, founded on specific research.

[5] In this regard, see Coutinho (1992). For many authors of the evolutionary or neo-Schumpeterian line, the cluster of innovations based on micro electronics, which arose in the 1970s, which revolutionized information and communications technologies is at the origin of change in the techno-economical paradigm that characterizes Kondratiev's fifth cycle. Two references in this interpretative line are Freeman and Louçã (2002) and Carlota Perez (2005).

characteristic of lean production: flexible and customized production of goods and services, just-in-time practices and new forms of organizing shop floor work, such as the quality control circles, among others.[6]

Second, the NICT had a great impact on the *flexibility of inter-firm relations* – inside the production chains or *between* production chains – which redefined competitive and innovative strategies of industrial corporations in the horizontal, as in the growth of forms of inter-firm cooperation, especially in carrying out R&D activities in industries with a high degree of technological intensity, and in the vertical direction, with the emergence of chain-firms, of production strategies focused on core competences and with the articulated movements of outsourcing and externalization of activities that generate less added value within the ambit of global value chains.[7]

Finally, but no less important, the NICT, by enabling the storage, treatment and transmission of a volume of data at once unimaginable scale, played an important role in *flexibility of capital allocation* with significant expansion of financial markets. The operation of the various institutions and the modern financial markets, with their striking array of new instruments and criteria for monitoring and assessing assets and the movement of large sums of money in arbitrage operations carried out in real time in the world's diverse financial markets, are only possible due to the advances brought on by the NICT. [8]

If on one hand, the expansion and growing importance of financial markets meant the expansion of forms and sources of corporation financing, on the other, the corporations progressively became managers of large masses of wealth with much diversified forms of valorization. Treasury operations at large corporations and the notable expression of financial result ratios in relation to operational results are expressions of a great mutation in the contemporary corporation, which has become a very peculiar organization in relation to

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[6] For an excellent appreciation of lean production (Toyotism) is reference is still Womack, Jones and Roos (1992).

[7] In this regard, see Chesnais (1996) and Sturgeon (2000).

[8] On the other hand, it is worth saying that the emergence of the NICT also benefited enormously from the growing importance on financial markets that permitted the agglutination of masses of idle capital, willing to finance the innovative activities of information and communications technology companies. The complex and fertile relations between NICT development and financial markets (cross-fertilization) appears in Aglietta and Ribérioux (2005).

its predecessors during the financial repression of the post-War golden years (Plihon, 2004).

After all, in this economy of owners of wealth, the search of capital valorization does not depend only on the production circuit. Capital valorization can be achieved in other spheres, mainly in the form of fictitious capital. This technological transformation and its application functioned like a disarticulator for economic and social relations solidly constructed during the period that extends from the end of the 19th Century to the 1970s, and which were firmly consolidated in the post-War golden years.

2. The NICT and Union Organization

The generalization of this phenomenon was the first hard blow to the union organization. First, it would be unthinkable for traditional forms of labor organization to reorganize around a total fragmentation of its base when goods and even services, once produce in specific and very well defined geographical regions, began to be produced in the most diverse parts of the world. Indeed, in face of the segmentation of the job market and the myriad of not always congruent claims that arise from this process, it becomes progressively more difficult for unions to organize worker resistance on behalf of common objectives.[9]

Second, the loss of political power by labor organizations is another numerical issue, since in various countries union levels have suffered serious setbacks.[10]

Third, from the perspective of the impact of production diversification made possible by the NICT on consumer markets, a destabilization of canonic forms of

[9] Furthermore, it is important to mention that the job market segmentation process is also driven by changes in key sectors that emerged with the Third Industrial Revolution. In accordance with Gorz (1991), comparing present conditions with those from the Second Industrial Revolution, the new key sectors employ relatively few permanent workers, mainly technicians and employees without union tradition and political roots. “The new technologies (...) lead to segmentation and division of workers into quasi-classes, which, in conformity with differences in interests, act in a completely different manner” (p.125). In the same sense, it can be said that these changes operate on job composition, with the relative growth of jobs in the tertiary sector. Growth of this sector, which includes much diversified job situations not only in terms of functions performed by workers, but also work conditions, implies growing difficulties for the unified representation of workers.

[10] For a firm appreciation of this phenomenon, the reference is a recent OECD document (2009). It presents data on unionization density in OECD member countries between 1960 and 2006. With the exception of a few countries that maintained unionization density at high levels, such as the Scandinavian countries, or at low levels, such as Spain and Chile, the other countries presented an expressive decrease in unionization indexes, especially after the 1980s.

mobilization and union fights was observed. This occurred as traditional strategies of political awareness were seriously weakened or even disabled by introducing methods and processes directly related to the NICT[11]. All these considerations point precisely to *insecurities in labor representation*, which deal with the political weakening of union organizations.[12]

Finally, it must be underscored that the NICT can be pointed out as partially responsible for the destruction of jobs and/or the worker's specific competences. This phenomenon intensified significantly over the last three decades of the 20th Century, forcing the union movement to restructure, in which it was not always successful.

However, we believe the assessment of NICT's impacts on job market destructuring may be overdimensioned in many analyses. Because, if it cannot be denied that technological advances in the production sector produce quantitative and qualitative impacts on the job market, the effective results on employment levels, on labor competences and on work relations depend on the articulation of macroeconomic, social and political factors (Mattoso, 2000). [13] In other words, it is necessary to critically analyze the *political economics* of this destructuring movement, without crediting it as being only, or mainly due to the technical transformations observed within the ambit of the NICT.

A second impact followed this disarticulating blow to traditional forms of labor division organization in a company and to its union representation, produced now, in a paradoxical manner, by the resources saved by these very workers.

3. Institutional Investors and changes in the forms of corporate governance

Once viewed as the phenomenon that would transform capitalism, making it more socialized after growth of the relative importance of Institutional Investor participation,

[11] The example of impacts from introducing technological innovations in relation to access to services on union political mobilization capacity in the banking sector may be the most elucidating example for this point. Social restraints and bargaining power stemming from bank strikes was broadly reduced with the introduction of ATMs, and more recently, the possibility of conducting bank transactions on the Internet.

[12] For the diverse forms of manifestation of insecurity at work consult Mattoso (1995).

[13] Affirming that technical progress cannot be directly responsible for the destruction of jobs and destructuring of the job market does not mean disparaging new technologies that could reduce the influence of unions in corporations. In this sense, it is useful to point out that the strategic redirection of corporate decisions in the sense of guaranteeing maximization of shareholder value made managers adopt tactics that permit reducing corporate dependence on unions and an intensification of the capital/labor ratio in many productive sectors, mainly using information and communications technologies. (Flingstein and Schin, 2007).

especially in the capital of large capitalist corporations (Drucker, 1977)[14], growth of these agents (insurance firms, investment funds and pension funds) indeed proved to be a second element of power in molding a *specific form of organization* of the capitalist corporation, and therefore of society, which contributed towards reformulation of the job market, to the detriment of the worker.

Institutional Investors became the main agents for contemporary capitalism as they concentrated gigantic masses of resources managed by investments made around the globe. These investments have a varied destination, including assets with greater liquidity and safety, such as public securities from core countries, to assets with greater volatility in profitability, and including a broad range of private securities like corporate bonds, shares in investment funds and shares in securitized assets, as well as very large participations in derivatives markets, not only in positions to protect against the main risks of price, interest and exchange rates, but also speculative positions, depending on the conveniences of specific statutes and the permissiveness of regulatory legislation[15].

Peter Drucker's dream can be seen as increasingly becoming Marx's nightmare. The socialization promoted by capital with its organization around Institutional Investors is a socialization that contributes decisively towards the disarticulation of the job market and its collective forms of consolidated representation in the post-War period. This occurs because these agents are not actually in control of those that, from their individual savings, form the original mass of resources that comprise them. Thus, once formed, this collective savings

[14] Drucker says Institutional Investors, especially pension funds, would be agents that by increasingly participating in the capital of large companies would provide a sort of "socialization of capital". This would occur as the capital property of an increasingly larger set of companies would be in the hands of agents who are, in turn the collective property of millions of workers.

[15] It is not worth extending here about data for Institutional Investor market positions. It should only be underscored that important institutional changes altered how these agents operate in recent years, making them more aggressive in terms of their actions in search of valorization of their portfolios' assets. Specifically in relation to pension funds, it is worth underscoring: 1. The transformation of pension structures founded on a simple asset allocation system to those founded on an asset capitalization system; 2. The "recent" change complementary capitalization pension plans underwent after transforming the risk distribution structure between participant and sponsor, that is, a change in Benefit Plans, which for the most part ceased being a Defined Benefit and became a Defined Contribution. For current data on Institutional Investors in the world, see http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37411_1_1_1_1_37411,00.html.

has centralized management, exclusively aligned to interests of capital in the sense of committing to its valorization to the detriment of other objectives.[16]

In the illusion of construction of a new Golden Age from the constitution and enlargement of Institutional Investors, belief in the transforming nature of their shareholder participations that would result in seats on the Supervisory Boards and Boards of Directors of capitalist corporations must be underscored. Through this *instrument of power*, Institutional Investors would be the artisans of a world in which workers would have increasing command and control over contemporary capitalism's strategic decisions, shaping the capitalist organization and society to make them more geared towards worker well-being, and thus social well-being (DRUCKER, 1977).

However, nothing could be further from the everyday practice of Institutional Investors: the centralization of management produces an alienation of the numerous participants/savers from the strategic decisions involving resource allocation. These resources are managed in accordance with the most common practices of *asset management* given the restrictions imposed by legislation and each investor's nature and specific proposal[17].

Pension funds are the players that could come closest to the model thought by those who view the Institutional Investors as the builders of a more benign new social order for society and for workers in particular. This would occur because these agents have longer term liability profiles, which would *naturally* lead to the composition of portfolios comprised of assets also with long term returns, such as investments in economic and social infrastructure, for example.

However, in practice, pension funds manage their assets and comprise their portfolios in a manner that closely resembles the one adopted by investment funds. Almost

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[16] We do not intend to ignore there is great diversity in the management of pension funds due to legislation in their countries of origin, financing models, pension systems for the Benefit Plans under their administration and the worker classes that participate in them. What we want to underscore is a very clear trend in the sense of prevalence of an asset management strategy geared towards the maximization of shareholder value. For an interpretation on this subject consult Sauviat (2002). In relation to the social effects of this risk distribution, see Hacker, 2008.

[17] Investment funds can have different liquidity horizons and different valorization goals, as imposed by their articles of incorporation. This implies different portfolios and the most varied management strategies. Insurance firms have more controlled horizons of liquidity needs due to the specialization of their risk control models. Pension funds, in general, have greater homogeneity in their liability profile, which is normally long-term maturity.

without exception, the preference for more liquid assets and the imposition of a minimum return standard (benchmark) at a specific level of pre-accepted risk structures the norm followed by Industrial Investors, including the pension funds.

Even in a portfolio of shareholder participations that grants pension funds a slice of company control, and therefore the indication of members to seats on the Board of Directors and Supervisory Board, strategic decisions are increasingly founded on criteria that permit these agents to undergo company restructuring, exclude them from participation, or at least to change the team of executive managers, as soon as necessary,

As a consequence of this attitude, generalized pressure for immediate results, pressure that consubstantiates adoption of the practice of less time for rendering accounts on the part of executive management (seen in the universalization of quarterly balance sheets), in a permanent demand for cost cuts, in a continuous review of suppliers, creditors and production destination markets, and therefore, in a set of governance practices that guide the capitalist corporation more and more in defining its actions and strategic decisions to the benefit of the shareholder and detriment of the other stakeholders[18].

4. **Impacts of new corporate governance structures on labor management**

In large corporations, conducts and strategies oriented towards prevalence in caring for shareholder interests, to the detriment of the needs of other stakeholder involved and/or implied in corporation's production processes, were consubstantiated into what has come to be called the *ideology of maximizing shareholder value*.[19] This new form of corporate governance, in theoretical terms firmly founded on *agency* models, affirms that the maximization of the corporations' stock exchange value would meet the interests of all stakeholders since the growth in share value would mean growth in accumulation potential and corporate growth.[20]

[18] Stakeholders are workers, suppliers, government, clients and local communities.

[19] See especially Lazonick and O`Sullivan (2002), Lazonick (2008), Aglietta and Riberioux (2005) and Miranda (2010). For agency models to justify maximization of shareholder value, see most especially Jensen (1986 and 1989) and Jensen and Meckling (1976).

[20] Other reasons were also pointed out to justify the importance of maximization of shareholder value. They include the idea that shareholders are *residual claimants* in the corporation, since their earnings are the only ones that cannot be established *ex-ante*. Thus, in the absence of mechanisms to guarantee the future earnings of these agents, their offer of resources for financing corporations could be seriously compromised. For this, see Jensen and Meckling (1976).

Among those impacts ascertained from this convergence of contemporary corporate governance standards towards stock exchange valorization criteria – in defense of shareholder interests – the significant number of salary inequities in corporations and a change in job management strategy stand out.[21]

In relation to salary inequities in corporations, it is fundamental to ascertain the big mutations introduced by the new forms of corporate governance, especially in manager remuneration. Well, if the new ideology of maximizing shareholder value mainly rests on the conflicting expression of manager and firm owner functions-objectives, the solution found constituted the creation of contracts with incentives that permit the realignment of interests of these two groups. Payment of high salaries to the top echelons of corporations, granting performance bonuses and stock options were all ways to stimulate managers in act in the sense of valorizing corporate shares.[22] The results of this process are clear: if in 1965, the top executives at American corporations were benefited with payments on average 44 times higher than shop floor workers, in 1998, earnings for these executives reached 419 times blue-collar worker salaries. (LAZONICK, O´SULLIVAN, 2000).

5. **The limits of shareholder union activism**

In face of this increasingly more explicit scenario, unions sought to participate increasingly more often in the strategic decisions taken in the pension funds, intent on reversing the paradoxal situation of having their resources serving as a strong element that reduces their power related to the fight for appropriation of social wealth. However, this direction lacks important restraints.

First, the lack of stronger ties of solidarity between workers from different countries limits the reach of actions that aim at restricting decisions that negatively affect workers in

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[21] Assuredly, the forms of corporate governance are not the same everywhere in the country. Saying that, we do not mean to say it is not possible to ascertain a tendency of convergence of these forms of governance to standards of maximization of shareholder value, greatly driven by the size of wealth and how large Institutional Investors act globally. However, there are interesting differences among national standards and for this it is interesting to consult Hall and Soskice (2006).

[22] Stock options are options to buy stock at a future date at current prices. Top executives who benefit from owning these assets have every interest in stock exchange valorization of these shares, making their buy options more lucrative.

other countries. The universalization of capital here shows its unequivocal advantages over a work organization limited to its own borders[23].

Furthermore, the focus of central operations, mainly chosen by the pension funds to seek a solution for their structural class dilemmas, was on directing resources to the so-called Socially Responsible Investments (in particular those called Ethical Funds), and the demand for companies to prepare Social Balances in which these agents have expressive participation.

The objective of the Social Balances is to underscore company actions on behalf of environmental and social sustainability, most often including the activities for mitigating the harmful effects of the company's regular operations on the environment and on workers. The guiding principal of the ever more disseminated elaboration of Social Balances stems from the understanding that additional practices are needed, imposed from outside the production process and that reorganize some environmental and social equilibrium.

Due to their participations, Institutional Investors, mainly pension funds, impose the elaboration of these Social Balances through their advisors, active in establishing environmental protection and labor norms, while also striving to demand the ever more ambitious profitability goals established for their benchmarks.

The narrowness of this *compensation strategy* is seen in the ready use of the Social Balance by large corporations. It is increasingly characterized as just a marketing piece in which brand promotion is the main objective.

Although there are actions that indeed contribute towards the reduction in the negative impact on regular activities by corporations on the environment, such as the recomposition of the plant layer by mining companies, or the destination of resources for activities that promote public interest actions related to the environment (such as the Tamar Project, sponsored by Petrobras), it is increasingly clearer that the lack of a Social Balance harms the company's image, especially before investors from organized markets, such as those that operate on the stock market. Stock market performance that captures the

[23] In this respect, French union activism is exemplary in its lukewarm approach to British pension funds. See: Sauviat (2005) and Plihon (2005).

valorization of companies that adopt recognized practices of good corporate governance (Corporate Governance Index – CGI), recently created by Bovespa, points to a valorization that exceeds the market index (IBOVESPA), in a clear sign of the importance in adopting management practices that contribute towards uniform standards of behavior for corporations in face of the need to remunerate their *shareholders*, including the elaboration of a Social Balance.

Ethical Funds, the main forms associated with the Socially Responsible Investment concept, are characterized by establishing criteria for excluding assets from your portfolio as a result of practices considered socially undesirable on the part of those responsible for these assets. Thus, an ethical fund would exclude shares of companies that have harmful practices to the environment and that do not take measures to create balance in these actions from an environmental perspective, for example. Shares of companies with practices related to the adoption of child or slave labor, as well as other socially similar practices would also be excluded.

Ethical funds have recently stood out as the most broadly accepted form by pension funds to mitigate the tension between their practices that only aim for the accumulation of capital and the social origins of the savings. However, in practice, the most diverse means are used by managers of ethical funds to permit the incorporation of assets in their portfolios that, although they break elementary rules of their main founders, can be incorporated with the objective of facilitating management and/or making it more profitable at a specific level of risk[24].

6. **Conclusion**

The way out found by pension funds around the world to the impasse that grows between the search for the highest possible remuneration at a certain level of risk for funds in their control and the social and political consequences of this practice encounters a core

[24] Ethical funds in Brazil are characterized by having shares of companies in their portfolios that notoriously cause negative impacts on large portions of the environment or have great threat potential to the environment when exercising their regular activities, such as mining and oil extraction companies. However, inclusion of these shares is justified for several reasons, including the need to have more liquid assets in the portfolio, which facilitates management, or even the veiled pressure exercised by the companies in their efforts to show they have adjusted to a time in which this attitude contributes decisively towards adding value to the company's brand.

contradiction. On one hand, there is a search to reduce the harmful environmental and social impacts of their regular activity of valorizing capital in their control via an incentive to allocate funds to Socially Responsible Investments (Ethical Funds), as well as the demand for a general adoption of Social Balances at corporations in which they have important shareholder participation. On the other hand, however, pension funds see themselves engaged in imposing new corporate governance practices that translate into a better operational and/or financial result for corporations in which they have shareholder participation mainly through the introduction and development of NICTs.

More often than not, this position results in the deterioration of job conditions for millions of workers who have their lives transformed by production flexibility processes, solidly expressed by spatial displacement of the production plants, increased automation, reduced staffs and more. It is not uncommon for many of these workers to be active participants in retirement and pension plans managed by the pension funds that promote these changes.

Resorting to compensatory strategies tied to Ethical Funds and Social Balances, however, seems doomed to failure simply because this does not imply a reversal of practices that, geared towards the valorization of capital and driven by pressure from the competition, lead to a gradual, but safe, disarticulation of the job market and union representation. This timid shareholder union activism seems to be hostage to practices that little contribute to the reversal of processes that gradually destroy the classic forms of social insertion via labor and its organized representation.

While on one hand they plant trees, the companies continue demanding longer work hours in exchange for lower pay. While in their contracts they state it is prohibited to hire third parties that adopt slave and child labor, the companies continue promoting the displacement of production plants that leave millions o workers around the world unemployed. While they elaborate their Social Balances, striving to show their efforts in the environmental and social field, the companies still adopt practices that exclusively benefit the shareholders, more often than not the Institutional Investors who pressure them to exceed established benchmarks.

None of this would seem odd to the laws of capitalist production were it not for the fact that these funds that comprise these centralized masses in Institutional Investors are derived from a savings made by those very workers. Everything occurs as if the workers continuously contributed towards the formation of masses of funds that work, also uninterruptedly, to dissolve those social forms that give security to the workers, including the entire structure for systems of well-being, as well as their job and their structures for collective representation.

It seems necessary to recognize that Institutional Investors are the very crystallization of laws inherent to capitalist production in which the fruits of social work constitute elements of destruction of its vital force: the workforce. It can be affirmed that Institutional Investors clearly express the “contradiction in process” of the capitalist system’s social organization. But only if this *démarche* is inexorable, that is, if it is natural and independent of political fights that develop in society.

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