

VI GLOBAL LABOUR UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE

Topic 3. Changes in the global economy and power structures and global governance reforms

FROM THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE TO THE REAL PLAN: CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND CONSEQUENCES ON WORK AND EMPLOYMENT

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ABSTRACT: This work intend to realize a historic review of the Brazilian industrialization process from the 70's to the 90's of twentieth century. The structural changes occucred in the Brazilian industry in this period are strongly linked to Neoliberalism and the appreciation and monetary stabilization contained in the plan to combat inflation of 1994 - the Real Plan. Moreover, the consequences of these changes on the structure of the labor market are strong, increasing rates of structural unemployment, precariousness work and informality, thus solidifying the weakening of unions and other labor organizations. Finally, from these limits the work is a reflection about the nationwide autonomy (dependence).

KEY-WORDS: National development; Industry; Labor; Changes

1. Introduction

The Latin-American periphery born under the aegis of the expansion of originate territorial states, and constituent part of large business that shaped the initial stage of capitalist history. Born as appendix of a process that had its center in another place, driven by a movement external itself, that periphery has worked, long, only as a trade and commercial reserve square, particularly in the case of Brazil, also as a basis of the operation of labor force (compulsory indigenous and black after). Such this initial conditions, shall be the Nation constitution process the same way? (...) (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - PAULANI, 2005, p.303 -4).²

Having its story marked by a colonial past, limited by the conditions briefly described above by Leda Paulani, it becomes clear that the process of industrialisation of Brazil, as well as much of Latin America, would course distinct path of originating industrialization countries.

Celso Furtado and ECLAC played theoretical noun to deny Rostow development theory, unravel the conditions of peripheral countries, reveal the contradictions of relationship centre/periphery and propose alternatives for overcoming such historic condition.

All this shows clearly in its rows blocks, the problematic in that moves the Eclac paradigm: the problem of national industrialization from a peripheral situation. Why the core issue of industrialization is centered in the opposition between the nation's economic development, or rather between the full Constitution of the nation and a particular international division of labour that had been turned into a limber and dependent economy. Why analysis relies on external sector, by successive adjustments between the structures of global supply and demand, the challenge of strangulation external nation responds with internal industrial growth (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - MELLO, 2005, p. 101).³

But it is from Latin America that emerge more fruitful answers about why not continent's development and on ways of resolving the issue. Thanks to the stimulus provided by ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America), the Argentine Economist Prebisch will find in deteriorating terms of trade in existing trade

² In the original: *A periferia latino-americana nasceu sob a égide da expansão dos estados territoriais originários, sendo parte constitutiva dos grandes negócios comerciais que conformaram a etapa inicial da história capitalista. Nascida como apêndice de um processo que tinha seu centro em outro lugar, impulsionada por um movimento externo a si mesma, essa periferia funcionou, por muito tempo, apenas como reserva comercial e praça comercial e, particularmente no caso do Brasil, também como base de operação da força de trabalho compulsória (indígena e depois negra). Sendo essas as condições iniciais, será que o processo de constituição da Nação dar-se-ia da mesma forma?*

³ In the original: *Tudo isto revela, claramente, em suas linhas basilares, a problemática em que se move o paradigma cepalino: a problemática da industrialização nacional a partir de uma situação periférica. Daí que o núcleo da questão da industrialização esteja centrado na oposição entre o desenvolvimento econômico da Nação, ou melhor, entre a plena constituição da Nação e uma determinada divisão internacional do trabalho que a havia transformado numa economia reflexa e dependente. Daí que a análise se apóie no setor externo, nos sucessivos ajustes entre as estruturas de oferta e demanda globais, no desafio do estrangulamento externo a que a Nação responde com o crescimento industrial interno.*

relations involving, on the other hand, the industrialized countries of the Centre with producer countries of raw materials and agricultural goods from the periphery, the main reason of not developing Latin American countries, indicating also, consequently, as the only way to solve the problem, the progressive and rapid industrialization of the past (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - PAULANI, 2005, pp. 306-7).⁴

It's with strong influence of ECLAC theory and international conditions of virtuous "30 glorious years ", that between the 1950s and the mid-1970s the discussion on development was on the agenda in Brazil, presenting industrialization as a mean to overcome underdevelopment, which contributed to the consolidation of a relatively large and complex industrial park.

In spite of industrialization, that germinated with strength after 1930, the country continued delayed, restricted because this form, with large quotas of its population pushed by the misery of regions forgotten by growth and modernization, which were made without being integrated to modern life of big cities (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - PAULANI, 2005, pp. 311-12).⁵

This insight led to a critique of evolutions in the early 1970s and intensified the debate between proponents of industrialization as a mean to achieve national autonomy and those who remphasized permanence of dependency of Brazil in the international arena. Taking nuances and differences in perspectives, generally authors such as Francisco de Oliveira (1981), Florestan Fernandes (1973), Fernando Henrique Cardoso & Enzo Faletto (1984) and Celso Furtado (1974) acknowledged that the dynamics of capitalist accumulation, national bourgeoisie's alliance with international capital, industrialization with the presence of monopolistic and antagonistic relationship (but at the same time complement and dialectics) between centre and periphery, prevented the autonomy and probed national dependence, since the existence of a complex industrial park.

Between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s, a series of cyclical changes and structural occurs in Brazil. Roughly speaking, we can highlight the high levels of growth experienced during the Economic Miracle (1968-73), the international

4 In the original: *Mas é da própria América Latina que surgem as respostas mais profícuas sobre o porquê do não desenvolvimento do continente e sobre as formas de resolver a questão. Graças ao estímulo concedido pela CEPAL (Comissão Econômica para a América Latina), o economista argentino Raúl Prebisch vai encontrar na deterioração dos termos de troca vigentes nas relações comerciais que envolviam, de um lado, países industrializados do Centro e, de outro, países produtores de matérias-primas e bens agrícolas da Periferia, a razão maior do não desenvolvimento dos países latino-americanos, indicando também, em consequência, como única forma de solucionar o problema, a rápida e progressiva industrialização dos últimos.*

5 In the original: *A despeito da industrialização, que brotara com força depois de 1930, o país continuou atrasado, tolhido, com largos contingentes de sua população empurrados pela miséria de regiões esquecidas pelo crescimento e pela modernização, os quais foram se incorporando, sem se integrar, à vida moderna das cidades que se agigantavam.*

crisis and the oil shocks of the 1970s, the fiscal crisis and the hyperinflation of the 1980s, the microelectronics as productive and technological standard on an international scale, the liberalism of the early 1990s and the monetary stabilization/appreciation caused by the Real Plan.

The goal of this article is to demonstrate, briefly, how these changes among the Economic Miracle and the actual plan affected the process of industrialization and the structure of national industry between the 1970s and 1990s, pointing out the consequences on labour and employment, in addition to contributing to the debate about the national autonomy (dependency).

2. The industrialisation front the crisis in the 1970s and 1980s

As a result of conditions imposed for national industrialization, Brazil incorporated late innovations and standards arising from Industrial Revolutions occurred in developed countries that tried to imitate. Thus, the textile industry and its new standards arising from the First Industrial Revolution reached to Brazil only at the beginning of the 19th century, and the fruits of the second Revolution after decades of the twentieth century (CANO, 1995).

This dynamic, most noticeable during the first three quarters of the 20th century, the heyday of industrialisation under import substitution process, is linked to the period and the way they gave the consolidation of industrial capitalism in that country (SILVA, 1976).

It is not enough, however, admit that Latin America industrialization is capitalist. It is necessary also agree that capitalist industrialisation in Latin America is specific and that its specificity is doubly determined: for your point of departure, the national exporters capitalist economies, and for its time, the moment that the monopolistic capitalism becomes dominant worldwide, in which the world capitalist economy is already formed. Is this industrialization that we call retardatory (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - MELLO, 1982, p. 104).⁶

⁶ In the original: *Não basta, no entanto, admitir que a industrialização latino-americana é capitalista. É necessário, também, convir que a industrialização capitalista na América Latina é específica e que sua especificidade está duplamente determinada: por seu ponto de partida, as economias exportadoras capitalistas nacionais, e por seu momento, o momento em que o capitalismo monopolista se torna dominante em escala mundial, isto é, em que a economia mundial capitalista já está constituída. É a esta industrialização que chamamos retardatória.*

Despite this retardatory character, Brazilian industry, along with national and world economy, experienced high levels of growth in the phase known as the economic miracle in the late 1960s and early 1970s, more precisely between 1968 and 1973.

However, was in the handling of fiscal and parafiscal funds source, as well as of resources from public credit through State funding agencies, that the Government has shaped definitely the profile of "miracle" economy, dependent on public funds, bureaucratic favors and credit. Brazilian capitalism, of patrimonial tradition, encountered an extremely fertile land of development, in which the authoritarian State concentrates resources then redistribute them on a discretionary basis according to the personal access code to the intimacy of the scheme (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - TAVARES & ASSIS, 1986, p. 30.)⁷

Growth reached the highest indices (reversal rate of 26%), being this a huge growth phase of the industry of durable consumer goods, with a positive impact on the labour market. This fact helped to form a very large and diversified working class, as well a new and genuine trade union movement.

The reversal of the expansive cycle from 1974 already indicated the boundaries of the model based on the production of durable consumer goods with concentration of income, in other words, the consolidation of short and unstable growth cycles due to a large 'instability in the growth rates of the leading sectors'. The Brazilian economy – increasingly internationalized and with its dynamics limited by exclusion and concentration of income – unsettled, slowing GDP growth, reducing private investment, accentuating the inflation and aggravating problems of balance of payments (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - MATTOSO, 1996, p. 131-2).⁸

Unlikely in developed countries, where the industrialization was accompanied by major investments in research and development (R&D) and Science and Technology (S&T), in this period the industries have struggled to maintain production itself, investing too little in important activities for the development of an innovative training itself.

7 In the original: *Contudo, foi na manipulação dos fundos de origem fiscal e parafiscal, bem como de recursos oriundos do crédito público através de agências de financiamento estatais, que o governo moldou definitivamente o perfil da economia do "milagre", dependente de fundos públicos, de favores burocráticos e de crédito. O capitalismo brasileiro, de tradição patrimonial, encontrou um terreno extremamente fértil de desenvolvimento, no qual o Estado autoritário concentra os recursos para depois redistribuí-los discricionariamente, de acordo com o acesso pessoal à intimidade do regime.*

8 In the original: *A reversão do ciclo expansivo a partir de 1974 já indicava os limites do modelo baseado na produção de bens de consumo duráveis com concentração de renda, ou seja, a consolidação de ciclos curtos e instáveis de crescimento devido a uma grande 'instabilidade nas taxas de crescimento dos setores líderes'. A partir de então a economia brasileira – cada vez mais internacionalizada e com sua dinâmica limitada pela exclusão e concentração de renda – se instabilizou, desacelerando o crescimento do PIB, reduzindo o investimento privado, acentuando a inflação e agravando os problemas do balanço de pagamentos.*

In practice, transformed into a machine growth at full steam, the Brazilian economy was running roughshod over and burying sub-consumerist thesis. Gradually became clear the anatomy of capitalist accumulation in progress. First there was the retaken, facilitated by expansionary policy that allowed credit indebtedness and differentiation of consumption of the middle classes. Then, the rapid growth and diversification of exports and imports, facilitated by the great boom of world trade and supported by internal incentives. Finally the expansion in the sectors of construction, electric and transport materials, pulled by the public and international private investment, represented by subsidiaries of foreign companies.

(...) The strong leg of national capital was not, however, the industrial capital. The new centralizer pact, exclusionary and authoritarian, strengthened greatly mercantile, agrarian and banking capital position, which was and still is the true dominant block. (...) (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - TAVARES & ASSIS, 1986, p. 38-9).⁹

It is necessary to emphasize that the 1950s and 1960s were responsible for giving the Brazil centers of Science and Technology, as the CNPq, CAPES and Finep, and of Research and Development, all of public character.

However, even in the last phase of the cycle of import substitution, the technology does not arise as effective requirement. The internal technological effort basically restricted to the use and learning production practices, being no more than necessary for the adaptation of processes, raw materials and products (...). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Brazilian industrial structure presented high degree of diversification of production, but with insufficient internal technological capacity. This situation induced the country to a technological demand centered on the so-called technological services chains (composed basically by analyses and tests) and an offer of R&D largely decoupled from the installed production system (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - COUTINHO, 1997, p. 126).¹⁰

So the Brazilian industrialization in the 1970s remained differentiated of developed economies at this crucial point: underinvestment in R&D and no training of innovative capacity. This character would extend and would complicate

9 In the original: *Na prática, transformada numa máquina de crescimento a pleno vapor, a economia brasileira foi atropelando e soterrando as teses sub-consumistas. Aos poucos, tornava-se clara a anatomia da acumulação capitalista em curso. Primeiro houve a retomada, facilitada pela política expansionista de crédito que permitiu o endividamento e a diferenciação de consumo das classes médias. Depois, o crescimento rápido e a diversificação das exportações e das importações, facilitados pelo grande boom do comércio mundial e apoiados numa bateria de incentivos internos. Finalmente a expansão nos setores de construção, elétrico e de materiais de transportes, puxada pelo investimento público e pelo privado internacional, representado este pelas filiais de empresas estrangeiras.*

(...) A pata forte do capital nacional não era, contudo, o capital industrial. O novo pacto centralizador, excludente e autoritário reforçou sobremaneira a posição do capital mercantil, agrário e bancário, que constituía e ainda constitui o verdadeiro bloco dominantes.

10 In the original: *No entanto, mesmo na última fase do ciclo de substituição de importações, a capacitação tecnológica não se colocava como requisito efetivo. O esforço tecnológico interno restringia-se basicamente ao uso e ao aprendizado das práticas de produção, sendo no máximo necessária à adaptação de processos, matérias-primas e produtos (...). Ao final dos anos 70 e princípio dos 80, a estrutura industrial brasileira apresentava elevados graus de diversificação da produção, porém com insuficiente capacitação tecnológica interna. Tal situação levou também a que se estabelecesse no país uma demanda tecnológica fundamentalmente centrada nos chamados serviços tecnológicos correntes (constituindo-se basicamente de análises e ensaios) e uma oferta de P&D em grande parte dissociada do sistema produtivo instalado.*

further in the 1980s, because industrial policies were subordinated to remedy the macroeconomic problems.

With a high degree of inter-sectoral integration and production diversification, mainly in the sectors of durable consumer goods and automotive, the period of miracle created a "feeling" of full employment, given the amazing economic growth and the emergence of a strong trade union movement in the struggle for better social conditions (given the concentration of income experienced during the period).

The 1970s meant to the country a period of great industrial expansion, marked not only by a significant growth of industrial production and employment, as by the development of an integrated industrial structure leaned on heavy industrialization process that began in 1956, when the economy has a rapid growth of the productive capacity of production goods and durable consumer goods (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - LEITE, 1998, p. 563).¹¹

However, when all gave the impression that we are about to enter the First World, the third industrial revolution broke out and it emerged the set of productive, technological, financial, commercial and geopolitical transformations, that would affect structures of world order and labour world (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - MATTOSO, 1996, p. 134).¹²

The 1980s ushered the countries that tried to follow the American pattern of development, through the emergence of a new productive and technological standard in international scale (the third industrial revolution, according to authors as Wilson Cano (1995)) and, in the case of Brazil, the era of "miracle" and the beginning of a large macroeconomic crisis.

External debt, hyperinflation, disorganization of public finances, among other issues, immobilized the State, leaving industrial policy subordinate to the maneuvers of macroeconomic trade surpluses generation, reduction of public investment and control of inflation, which already began to deteriorate the structure of employment. Not only that, but the logic of transnational capital begins to take a more intense shape in the country, leaving the State increasingly weakened politically and financially.

11 In the original: *A década de setenta significou para o país um período de grande expansão industrial, marcado não só por um significativo crescimento da produção e do emprego industrial, como pelo desenvolvimento de uma estrutura industrial integrada que se apoiou no processo de industrialização pesada que se instaura a partir de 1956, quando a economia assistiu a um crescimento acelerado da capacidade produtiva do setor de produção e de bens de consumo duráveis.*

12 In the original: *No entanto, quando tudo dava a impressão de estarmos prestes a entrar no Primeiro Mundo, eclodiu a Terceira Revolução Industrial e emergiu o conjunto de transformações produtivas, tecnológicas, financeiras, geopolíticas e comerciais que abalariam as estruturas da ordem mundial e do mundo do trabalho.*

Since then, more and more short-term measures were being taken with the purpose of troubleshooting, so that the national industry could not reorganize or develop itself. Instead, it made a defensive adjustment, keeping the same structure, with fall in investment in gross fixed capital formation and, of course, without developing innovative training itself.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the macroeconomic instability emphasized, the inflationary process and the State crisis accelerated, resulting in exacerbation of defensive strategies and weakening efforts Scientific and technological development. There was therefore a significant decline in the face of: a) oscillation and crisis in S&T system; b) disentanglement of investments of public enterprises and correlative weakening of its R&D centres; c) dismantling structures, stagnation and even retreat of private sector technological expenditures, which were already being thinned enough (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - COUTINHO, 1997, p. 127).¹³

These “survival” measures simply postponed the issue. Barriers encountered later due to the various cuts, as in Research and Development, Science and Technology, investment, unlikely what has been observed in developed countries, would be even greater, forcing the country to be always importing technologies or paying high prices for patents, stimulating multinational entry so that these could increase development of national industry.

Jorge Mattoso (1996) divides the 1980s into three periods. The first one (1981-83) is when the country suffers due to external adjustment, having the same negative effect on the industrial product and GDP. Favored by increased exports, the second period (1984-86) marks a recovery in the domestic economy, favored by the United States trade deficits. Finally, the third period (1987-89) is characterised by the more orthodox policies of economy administration, with rising inflation and currency crisis, when the Government found itself facing a technique (1987) and white (1989) moratorium, thus delaying the payment of interest on foreign debt.

The labour market in the 1980s showed relatively low levels of unemployment in Brazil in relation to other countries in Latin America, as a result often attributed to the slower population growth, smaller emigration to urban

13 In the original: *Nos anos 80 e início dos anos 90, acentuou-se a instabilidade macroeconômica, acelerou-se o processo inflacionário e a crise do Estado, resultando na exacerbação das estratégias defensivas e num maior enfraquecimento do esforço de desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico. Verificou-se, portanto, um significativo retrocesso em face de: a) oscilação e crise do sistema de C&T; b) desarticulação dos investimentos das empresas públicas e correlato enfraquecimento dos seus centros de P&D; c) desmontagem das estruturas, estagnação e até recuo dos gastos tecnológicos do setor privado, os quais já eram bastante rarefeitos.*

centres, the large increase in employment in the public sector and the maintenance of industrial structure.

This behavior of unemployment indicates that the growth of the economically active population, which had a slower pace than in the 1970s, was absorbed in some way. And this absorption occurred in urban activities, because the weight of agricultural activities in total occupation during the 1980s continued to fall (...) However, the processing industry and construction have not had a predominant role in the absorption of the active population in urban activities, because these were precisely the sectors most affected by the economic crisis. In fact, the occupancy level support in the 1980s depended much of the absorption capacity of tertiary activities. Increased participation of trade and services (...) (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - BALTAR, DEDECCA & HENRY, 1998, p. 92-3).¹⁴

Certainly the performance of the labour market cannot be considered only by the processing industry. However, the table presented means a reduction of investment in the industry itself.

Formal industrial jobs created after the recession of the early 1980s did not have the same nature of those eliminated during this period, since reduced participation of metallurgical professional jobs and increased jobs in industries of nondurable consumer goods, especially clothing and footwear, food products and beverages. Finally, there has been explosive growth of public employment, but with pronounced demotion of wage level (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - BALTAR, P & HENRY, 1998, p. 614).¹⁵

We can deduce that the stagflation that marks this decade was vital to increase the problems of employment and poverty, not only that, but mainly (although the level of employment did not decline so much), that the labour structure had already started to change, with a large increase of informality and self-employed people.

The tinformal employment of non-agricultural takeover in the 1980s has been associated with two phenomena: i. The slow growth in formal wages in private companies, which reflected the low dynamics, mainly in the processing industry and construction; II. The proliferation of small business, demonstrated by rapid

14 In the original: *Esse comportamento do desemprego indica que o aumento da população economicamente ativa, que teve um ritmo mais lento que nos anos 70, foi absorvido de alguma forma. E essa absorção ocorreu nas atividades urbanas, pois continuou a cair o peso das atividades agrícolas na ocupação total durante a década de 80 (...) No entanto, a indústria de transformação e a construção civil não tiveram um papel predominante na absorção da população ativa em atividades urbanas, pois foram justamente estes setores os mais atingidos pela crise econômica. De fato, a sustentação do nível de ocupação nos anos 80 dependeu muito da capacidade de absorção das atividades terciárias. Observou-se um aumento da participação do comércio e dos serviços (...)*

15 In the original: *Os empregos industriais formais criados após a recessão do início dos anos 80 não tiveram a mesma natureza daqueles eliminados neste período, já que se reduziu a participação dos empregos das categorias profissionais metalúrgicas e aumentaram os empregos nas chamadas indústrias de bens de consumo não duráveis, notadamente vestuário e calçados, produtos alimentares e bebidas. Finalmente, houve crescimento expressivo do emprego público, mas com pronunciado rebaixamento do nível dos salários.*

growth of the number of own-account workers, employers and workers without work, mainly in trade and services, in particular in the segment of repair and maintenance. The predominance of this type of occupational opportunities points clearly to a deterioration of the Brazilian labour market in the 1980s (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of -BALTAR, DEDECCA & HENRY, 1998, p. 94).¹⁶

Despite this "benefit" in comparison with countries that were restructuring, one should ask a fact. This non adjustment and the maintenance of industrial structure contributed to that, in the 1980s, the country had this performance somewhat better than those who were being restructured. However, in the next decade, when nearly all countries are restructured, it would be more difficult and costly to follow the Standards imposed by the third industrial revolution and the globalization of capital, bringing dramatic consequences in the 1990s.

We can't leave aside the importance of the oil shocks in the 1970s about the 1980s and 1990s. With the first shock in 1973, the exporting countries accumulated a vast amount of dollars (petrodollars), and they started to invest those dollars in international banks (mostly American) with headquarters in Europe (WACHTEL, 1988). With this great amount of money, the banks began to lend petrodollars with low interest and flexible rates, and Brasil preferred to use those advantages instead of renegotiate the existing debt.

The year of 1979 marks a second oil shock, as well as the beginning of a period (that extends until 1982) in which the United States pass through difficulties in their restructuring phase to the third industrial revolution, being then obliged to increase the interest rate from 6% to almost 20% (ARRUDA, 1999). This also considerably increased costs and owned Brazilian foreign debt, with consequent effects on the 1980s and, mainly, on the 1990s, when Brazil and its politics are increasingly subordinated to North American and expedience of neoliberalism.

Thus, the 1980s have to Brazil a character of income concentration and exclusion, process started in the 1970s with the great industrialization. The 1970s, however, disguise this character by the growth of "economic miracle", while the

16 In the original: *A informalização da ocupação não-agrícola nos anos 80 esteve associada a dois fenômenos: I. O lento crescimento do assalariamento formal em empresas privadas, que refletiu o baixo dinamismo em especial da indústria de transformação e da construção civil; II. A proliferação de pequenos negócios, manifesta no rápido crescimento do número de trabalhadores por conta própria, empregadores e assalariados sem carteira de trabalho, principalmente no comércio e nos serviços, em particular no segmento de reparação e conservação. A predominância desse tipo de geração de oportunidades ocupacionais aponta claramente uma deterioração do mercado de trabalho brasileiro nos anos 80.*

1980's and its constant crisis are most evident while causing a change in the structure of employment, which lasted and increased substantially in the 1990s.

the Brazilian crisis of the 1980s that extend until today is a crisis of depletion of a pattern of excluding development associated with the outbreak of the third industrial revolution amid the conservative offensive in advanced countries. This profound transformation of world capitalism on the one hand, redefined the productive, technological parameters, concentration of capital, globalization and financial instability. On the other hand, didn't advance toward articulating a clear pattern hegemonic development, accentuating the uprooting of international economic order and favouring the disorder in the world of work (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of -MATTOSO, 1996, p. 142).¹⁷

3. Neoliberalism and Real Plan: structural changes

In 1989, gathered in the capital of the United States the North American Government, the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and a number of economists and politicians in the so-called Washington Consensus, to take stock of neoliberal policy already implemented in the Latin American countries and also to implement it in Brazil and Peru, which until then had not adhered to that policy (BAPTIST, 1994).

After the victory of Collor and during the early 1990s, only the neoliberal strategy seemed to be present as an alternative to exhaustion of Brazilian development pattern. The alternatives seemed quite plain, though very little original: If we wanted to achieve first World (or the third industrial revolution), we should adjust ourselves in a subordinate way to new winds of the world economy. To move to the First World, conceived as something already defined and whose determinations would be definitive, we should seek static comparative advantages under promise – like there in the 19th century – of greater aggregate wealth if we specialize passively, according to conditions laid down by the world market (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - MATTOSO, 1996, p. 142).¹⁸

17 In the original: (...) a crise brasileira dos anos 80 e que se prolonga até hoje é uma crise de esgotamento de um padrão de desenvolvimento excludente, associada à eclosão da Terceira Revolução Industrial em meio à ofensiva conservadora nos países avançados. Esta profunda transformação do capitalismo mundial, por um lado, redefiniu os parâmetros produtivos, tecnológicos, de concentração de capitais, de globalização e instabilidade financeira. Por outro, não avançou na direção da articulação de um claro padrão hegemônico de desenvolvimento, acentuando a desestruturação da ordem econômica internacional e favorecendo a desordem do mundo do trabalho.

18 In the original: Depois da vitória de Collor e durante os primeiros anos da década de 90, apenas a estratégia neoliberal parecia estar presente como alternativa ao esgotamento do padrão de desenvolvimento brasileiro. O que se nos oferecia parecia bastante claro, embora muito pouco original: se quiséssemos alcançar o Primeiro Mundo (ou a Terceira Revolução Industrial), que nos ajustássemos de forma subordinada aos novos ventos da economia mundial. Para avançarmos para o Primeiro Mundo, concebido como algo já definido e cujas determinações seriam definitivas, deveríamos novamente buscar vantagens comparativas estáticas sob a promessa – como lá no séc. XIX – de maior riqueza agregada se nos especializássemos passivamente de acordo às condições determinadas pelo

In this way, the commercial opening combined with greater competitiveness and neoliberal policy guidelines, forced the industry to begin a national restructuring, not financially-sheet as at the end of the 1980s, but a restructuring of production itself, characterized by un-verticalization, outsourcing, concentration on the most competitive product lines, costs cuts and quality programs, organizational and managerial innovations, greater worker involvement, just in time, quick response, etc.

However, changes made by the national industry and techniques adopted were always lagged compared to developed countries, with deepening of divorce between Bank and industry and national capital groups of the same size (more investments in modernisation, not expansion) as well as the reduction of Brazilian participation in international trade, in view of the increasing specialisation and sophistication of the commodities themselves, with the exception of a few leading companies.

The "defensive" sense of business strategies should not, however, be interpreted as paralysis and inability to adapt. Unlike, companies reacted with great speed on oscillations of economic framework and on signs of political-institutional system. It should be pointed out, however, that the adjustment measures adopted little contributed to the correction of the most serious deficiencies of the Brazilian business system. The fragility of this system in comparison with rivals tends, on the contrary, to deteriorate, unless companies change the general direction of adjustment and adopt strategies that prioritize the reorganization and competitive management, the innovative capacity, the production efficiency, the human resources training and cooperation with workers (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - COUTINHO & FERRAZ, 1993, p. 199).¹⁹

In the 1990s the traditional industry sectors (such as metal mechanics) of previous decades, began to be replaced by a constantly innovative industry with products of short life cycles, characterized by a high growth of the microelectronics sector, which started to dominate the market and required constant investments in R&D, contributing to Brazil be relatively more differed.

mercado mundial.

19 In the original: *O sentido "defensivo" das estratégias empresariais não deve, entretanto, ser interpretado como paralisia e incapacidade de adaptação. Ao contrário, as empresas reagiram com grande velocidade às oscilações do quadro econômico e às sinalizações do sistema político-institucional. Deve-se salientar, porém, que as medidas de ajuste adotadas pouco contribuíram para a correção das deficiências mais graves do sistema empresarial brasileiro. A fragilidade desse sistema vis-à-vis os rivais tenderá, pelo contrário, a agravar-se, a menos que as empresas alterem a orientação geral do ajuste e adotem estratégias que priorizem a reorganização e a gestão competitivas, a capacidade de inovação, a eficiência produtiva, a capacitação de recursos humanos e a cooperação com os trabalhadores*

The first day of July 1994 marked the Government Itamar Franco and prepares the bases for the election of the Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The Plano Real, cherished the national currency and promoted the so desired stabilisation, responsible for ending as well with the inflation that twasted the country.

The increase in purchasing power due to the increase in real wages in a country without inflation, credit expansion, products imported at the same price as national, access to white line, led workers to start a consumption boom, giving the State full support to this euphoria continuation. As noted Bielschowsky (1997), favorelly there were inflation control, real wage and financing of durable goods increase, "wealth effect" due to the appreciation of fixed and financial assets.

On the other hand, there were lower GDP growth (coming to grow only 0.2% in 1998), increasing of the Government interest of rate, to attract external resources and prevent inflationary pressures (26.8% p.y. in 1998), of the domestic debt (passes of 153 billion in 94 to 500 billion in 89), plus a high exchange rate, causing ambiguous effect on the decision to invest (BIELSCHOWSKY, 1997). These policies have created a "growth trap" according to Delfim Neto (1997), leaving the country held hostage by a stop and go dynamic.

The national industry, "unexpectedly", deteriorated, losing space for all others wich offered in Brazil products extremely cheap, even in the commodities market. The "Third industrial revolution" led to the explosion of microelectronics and technology-intensive products, and the opening and recovery/stabilization meant that they were competing with the nationals.

According to Coutinho and Ferraz (1993, p. 133) the most important features of this framework in the 1990's are: the complexity of new technologies, increasingly dependent of investments in R&D, very rapid rate of change in processes and products, because of the companies that compete globally, fusion Technologies, higher speed and lower price of storing and transporting application information, fundamental changes in organizational structure and in the production process. As you note, the expense of undertakings in R&D become essential to allow them to compete.

But in Brazil the participation of business expenses in R&D total spending "(...) is situated around 20%, in advanced countries is above 40%, reaching out to achieve, in Japan, more than 70%" (COUTINHO & FERRAZ, 1993, p. 135).

The bulk of imported products as a mean of increase competition and spread the elevation of prices, has not been efficient to leverage a sustained growth for the Brazilian Park. Furthermore, encouraging direct investment (FDI) in its various forms, from portfolios until the large entry of important oligopolistic firms in world, as a mean both to increase competition, help pay off the external debt, how to bring new technologies, develop suppliers of inputs and components, and promote the resumption of sustainable growth. Thus, foreign direct investment has increased considerably during the 1990s, mainly after 1994, when it begins to take a new shape.

Unlikely the early 1990s, foreign companies in Brazil contributed significantly to the deficit in the trade balance, due to trade intrafirma, the import of components and supplies increasingly intense in technology, in other words, a reduction of nationalization of final goods and less effort from such firms to export. Not only that, but the increase in interest rates as a mean of attracting investments, contributed not only to the speculative capital that went on to take advantage of these opportunities, but to reduce national investments.

Therefore, the 1990s are striking for the structure of Brazilian industry, which has always had in your Park the presence of foreign companies and other forms of FDI. In the early 1990s there was a conservative restructuring, wich characteristics were already presented. From 94, however, a change occured, which showed at the side of foreign companies through a large increase in imports, with exports not growing enough to equalize the deficits.

The flow of FDI in the early 1990s was strongly associated with a process of rationalisation and modernisation of production structure. The urgent need to reduce costs and increase competitiveness, to face effective or potential imports and, to search for new markets that could cover a loss (absolute or relative) of the restricted domestic market, stimulated the adoption of strategies of specialization and complementarity productive and commercial. Initially, the contestation of some established oligopolic structures took place mainly through increased imports and then already in a frame of resumption of domestic growth, also with the entry of new companies. The abandonment of product lines with inadequate production scales and/or with non-competitive cost structures, the deepening of the process of outsourcing for productive activities and not only complementary, and the elevation of the imported content resulting from the replacement of local

suppliers for external are some of the most important strategies adopted (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - LAPLANE & SARTI, 1997, p. 148).²⁰

(...) the strategy of enterprises had as return increases of profitability and competitiveness levels, particularly productivity gains and reduction of operational and financial costs. However, in systemic terms, this restructuring result in weakening of productive and technological threads, loss of multiplier and inductor industry power, whose growth rate has been hereinafter than that of other sectors of activity and, especially, in negative impacts on trade balance (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - LAPLANE & SARTI, 1997, p. 151).²¹

The main consequence of this new character of the industrial park was on the structure of labor and employment, which had a considerable reduction in the number of formal jobs in the 1990s.

The elimination of more than three million formal jobs between 1990 and 1999 (MATTOSO, 1999), was a consequence not only of economic conjuncture which Brazil joined, but also structural changes in the economy, how its industry restructured to face opening trade and exchange rate appreciation to achieve the "promised" development and, also, changes in the structure of the labour market itself forward to that.

(...) The traditional dichotomy of the labour market — employment and unemployment — spells out a face increasingly reduced of the phenomenon, with observed changes in employment structures profiles and unemployment show its most violent aspect, since it suggests the establishment of a new and particular social exclusion process. We can consider it as new because it differs clearly from those known past eras of capitalism (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - DEDECCA, 1998, p. 55).²²

20 In the original: *O fluxo de IDE do início dos anos 90 esteve fortemente associado a um processo de racionalização e modernização da estrutura produtiva. A necessidade premente de redução de custos e aumento de competitividade, para fazer frente às importações efetivas ou potenciais e, em menor medida, para a busca de novos mercados que pudessem suprir, parcialmente, a perda (absoluta ou relativa) do mercado doméstico restringido, estimulou a adoção de estratégias de especialização e de complementaridade produtiva e comercial. Inicialmente, a contestação (instabilização) de algumas estruturas oligopólicas estabelecidas deu-se preponderantemente através de maiores importações e, só depois, já em um quadro de retomada do crescimento interno, também com a entrada de novas empresas. O abandono de linhas de produtos com escalas de produção inadequadas e/ou com estruturas de custo não competitivas, o aprofundamento do processo de terceirização para atividades produtivas e não apenas complementares e a elevação do conteúdo importado decorrente da substituição de fornecedores locais por externos são algumas das mais importantes estratégias adotadas.*

21 In the original: *(...) a estratégia das empresas teve como contrapartida aumentos de rentabilidade e dos níveis de competitividade, sobretudo ganhos de produtividade e reduções de custos operacionais e financeiros. Entretanto, em termos sistêmicos, esta reestruturação resulta em fragilização dos encadeamentos produtivos e tecnológicos, perda do poder multiplicador e inductor da indústria, cuja taxa de crescimento tem sido inferior à dos demais setores de atividade e, sobretudo, em impactos negativos na balança comercial.*

22 In the original: *(...) A tradicional dicotomia do mercado de trabalho – emprego e desemprego – explicita cada vez mais uma face reduzida do fenômeno, sendo que as mudanças observadas nos perfis das estruturas de emprego e de desemprego mostram seu aspecto mais violento, já que sugerem o estabelecimento de um novo e particular processo de exclusão social. Podemos considerá-lo como novo porque ele se diferencia claramente daqueles conhecidos em épocas passadas do capitalismo.*

The industry analysis is important as it was responsible for almost the entire formal unemployment, only the processing industry, responsible for almost 60%²³ of the value. This fact is evident when one considers that unemployment grew substantially in large cities, reaching in 1998, 24.2% of economically active population (PEA) in Salvador and 18.3% in São Paulo²⁴.

The 1990s marked a break. Before, mainly in the 1970s, the reduction in employment could be attributed to the crisis, and in recovery, workers were again incorporated (cyclical unemployment). In the 1990s the microelectronics, reorganising productive and economic rationalization with new organizational and modernizations methods, as a means to adapt to crisis, unemployed thousands of workers, in which they are no longer embedded in production when there is a recovery, so we could observe the highest rate of open unemployment²⁵ since 1984. This index more than doubled between the beginning of the real plan and the end of 1998 (4.28% 90 against 7.67% of pea in 98, according to the IBGE).

The consequences of this new unemployment are drastic. The change in employment relationships and on the structure of the same imposed hamper the dismissed enter again the labour market, leading many previous formal workers to seek means of survival, whether lawful or unlawful. This way, the precarious and informal work have grown considerably.

The first three years of the 1990s revealed the depth of Brazilian social crisis and provided – through numerous episodes shown by the press – to show the country's most conservative segments that the problem is not restricted to "low", since its not confrontation extended to "top", with increasing and dangerous private and social insecurity. (...) What these conservative elites always tried, was actually "push with the belly" our social problems, believing that the agricultural frontier, industrialization and urbanization – and, remember, clampdowns – would give account of the ills of our poverty and misery historically accumulated.

If this was considerably until the 1970s, it is no longer. First because the "external" debt crisis and the macroeconomic adjustments attempts entirely took us in the 1980s; secondly, because, since 1990, the attempts of neoliberal economic policies exacerbated our social crisis and, finally, the clear need to fit, albeit long-term, to restructuration imposed by the third industrial revolution

23 The data of the last two paragraphs were withdrawn from the General Cadastre of employed and unemployed (CAGED), the Ministry of Labor, through the website www.mtb.gov.br

24 Data from the text "5 years of the Real Plan", through the website of www.dieese.gov.br

25 It's considered open unemployed those whose are seeking work in an effective manner in the 30 days prior to the interview and had no work in the last 7 days

*mainly exacerbates the problems of employment and income distribution (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - CANO, 1998, pp. 589-90).*²⁶

Thus, the increased levels of unemployment were possible not only through innovations, but also through other factors:

1-The new possibility of imports meant that there was a substitution of domestic production of marketable internationally by imported goods, eliminating, according to the IPEA, about 560 000 industrial jobs until 1995;

2-Linked to the process of outsourcing services by industry, we can say that this is a factor of restructuring responsible not only for unemployment, but for the transfer of many jobs to the informal sector, which will no longer be just social crisis buffer;

3-this process of modernisation and rationalisation of industry aims to gross fixed capital formation.

We should give particular attention to this third point. Brazil, deficient in R&D, always depended of international innovations. Once again, given this new framework the non investment in gross fixed capital formation increased national dependence.

Not only that, but the capital goods sector and those allies to R&D investments, the products intense in technology, are becoming increasingly important for the industry. As in Brazil industries are lagging behind at this point and multinationals here installed have the possibility to import parts and components technology intensive from the main office, the tendency is that this deficiency do not remedied.

26 In the original: *Os três primeiros anos da década de noventa desnudaram a profundidade da crise social brasileira e se prestaram – através de inúmeros episódios demonstrados pela imprensa – a mostrar aos segmentos mais conservadores do país que o problema não se restringe aos “de baixo”, uma vez que seu não enfrentamento se estendeu aos “de cima”, com crescente e perigosa insegurança privada e social. (...) O que essas conservadoras elites sempre tentaram, na verdade, foi “empurrar com a barriga” nossos problemas sociais, acreditando que a fronteira agrícola, a industrialização e a urbanização – e, é bom lembrar, a repressão policial – dariam conta dos males de nossa pobreza e miséria historicamente acumuladas.*

Se isto era considerável até a década de setenta, dali para hoje não mais o é. Primeiro porque a “crise da dívida externa” e as tentativas de ajustes macroeconômicos nos pegaram ‘por inteiro’ na década de oitenta; segundo, porque, a partir de 1990, as tentativas das políticas econômicas neoliberais agravaram ainda mais nossa crise social e, por fim, a inequívoca necessidade de nos ajustarmos, ainda que a longo prazo, à reestruturação imposta pela Terceira Revolução Industrial agravará sobretudo os problemas de emprego e distribuição de renda.

Despite the dynamism in some sectors, note that the same was often with privatization, being that the intermediate and capital goods (essential sectors for the national independence and, which sought to develop in various import substitution plans, such as the goals of Juscelino Kubitschek), essential for the economic development of the country by "their own feet" was quite damaged. Thanks to this aspect that was set up, as well as its job-destructive instrument character, such restructuring may be called destructive.

Of course, with such destructive aspect must be, on the other hand, a promoter restructuring, which is defended by several authors. This fact is undeniable. Some sectors of Brazilian industry, industry segments presented, with the modernization and rationalization imposed, such development and dynamism which grew remarkably and, generating jobs. For example Informatics, that during the period considered, formed hundreds of technicians and experts, companies aim to develop programs and technologies for computer.

The most intriguing is the fact of such promoter restructuring have given more intensely significantly in developed countries, where the deterioration of jobs in industry, generates jobs in others that arise, causing a not growing level of unemployment such as observed in developing countries. This is helped by multinationals of developed countries here installed and with increasing concentration of capital, which took this importer character in the face of deregulation, with increased remittance of profits, making our market create jobs and investments in the countries of origin, in the country in which they are fitted.

In addition to the high levels of unemployment, the entire industry restructuring in the 1970s to 90 changed the structure of the labour itself. The shortage of employment against the requirements of flexibility meant that workers seek individual outputs, thus decreasing the syndications and bargaining power.

Two important aspects mark this proposition. As noted previously, the new standard employment relationship has been shown to be incompatible with the main standards that organized the previous pattern, requiring a fragmentation of collective negotiations. They are no longer the primary forum for the establishment of occupancy classifications, of the workday and wages. Consolidates the possibility of a diversification of working conditions, working hours and occupational structures and wage by industry, by company and, perhaps, by job title or occupation. The second concerns the need of a coact relation – individualized if possible - where the participation of unions and the State is considered largely unwelcome. The trend of declining unionization rate is

an important symptom of this motion for exclusion of unions of negotiation processes (MANDARINO, T.M. – free translation of - DEDECCA, 1998, p. 65).²⁷

Thus, productive rationalization tended to raise levels of unemployment and changing employment relationships, making them increasingly precarious and subject to conditions of flexibility, with decrease of journey and wage, individual contract, part-time, anyway, an instability in the market and labour relations itself.

To this framework adds the possibility of mergers, privatisations and the purchase of Brazilian companies by transnational, although promote benefits in the sector, contributed to the high levels of unemployment. Many of these mergers and privatization were made in strategic sectors for the country, such as energy, telecommunications, banks. Thus, the country becomes increasingly internationalized, with the presence of bulk and foreign companies, few national developed.

4. Final Considerations

The realization of this dynamism in developed countries led to the defense, by several economists and politicians, that the measures implemented in the period between the years 1970-1990 (strong presence of foreign capital in its various forms, and conformity to the paradigms neoliberalism neoliberalism), were indispensable in order for the country managed to "imitate" international standards, exit undeveloped condition and promote the autonomy and the "trip to the first world".

It is necessary to investigate, however, the chances of promoting this path along the lines adopted, since the historical conditions, the role of Brazil in the

²⁷ In the original: *Dois aspectos importantes marcam esta proposição. Como apontado anteriormente, o novo padrão de relações de trabalho tem mostrado ser incompatível com as principais normas que organizavam o padrão anterior, exigindo uma fragmentação das negociações coletivas. Elas deixaram de ser o fórum básico para o estabelecimento das classificações de ocupação, da jornada de trabalho e dos salários. Consolida-se a possibilidade de uma diversificação das condições de trabalho, dos tempos de trabalho e das estruturas ocupacionais e salariais por setor, por empresa e, talvez, por cargo ou ocupação. A Segunda diz respeito à necessidade de uma relação cooperada – se possível individualizada –, onde a participação dos sindicatos e do Estado é considerada, em grande medida, indesejável. A tendência da queda da taxa de sindicalização é um sintoma importante deste movimento de exclusão dos sindicatos dos processos de negociação.*

international division of labour and restructuring that occurred in the period in question are completely different from those countries "templates".

Noting further the need to resume the debate about the development of Brazil. The neoliberal discourse, to present itself as scientific truth, went on to identify better living conditions for the population with balance of macroeconomic indicators, relegating the issue of national autonomy to a background.

The period evaluated in this article (from the economic miracle to Real Plan) demonstrated that industrial restructuring with the changes occurred was responsible for increasing the levels of unemployment, for change unfavorably to workers the labour structure and for deepen the Brazil dependence in relation to developed countries

It is on this brief trajectory that this work contributes to the debate on the feasibility of effective national autonomy and improving of Brazilian people's living conditions in the capitalist production mode, given the prospect of molds recently applied, the structures and delays historically determined and the role assigned to Brazil in view of the various forms of capital manifestation.

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