The Peasantary with Modern Capitalism: 
Power, Position, and Class

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Introduction

A debate rages in agrarian studies between those proposing the dissolution of the peasant class and those claiming its continued presence. On both sides, fantastic narratives have been constructed and self-reinforced. These theories of class development have become greatly separated from historical developments or contemporary empirical evidence.

In the fray, the utility of class analysis has been lost. This is not surprising considering the impotence of Classical Marxism in the face of a growing peasant class. Despite caveats, the thrust of the argument from Marx to Lenin has been the continual, deepening separation of the means of production from labour. The peasantry are a remnant of old times, destined to be swept away by the rise of capitalist farming. Time did not validate this story. Instead, the history of capitalism is replete with expansions of peasant enterprise.

Something more is needed for class theory to have salience in peasant studies. The incomplete nature of primitive accumulation and its periodic reversal must be explained. An engine of movement is needed, which is capable of endowing peasants with means of production. By explaining both dispossession and repossession, peasant class analysis can be re-embedded in current empirical findings, as well as, the broader capitalist project.

This is a lofty task, but an important one. The global farming population represents 40 percent of humanity, and still, the chronically hungry population of the globe stands at 1 billion.\(^1\) Formal employment has failed to keep pace with rising populations and slums have grown precipitously. The resource crisis makes it clear that the world is not capable of supplying everyone with a Northern standard of living. On top of all, growing climate chaos necessitates the rapid diversification of food crops as a means to mitigate natural disaster.

A new development vision is needed. One that is capable of supplying the population of the planet with decency of life. The peasant class will play a central role in any such transformation. Understanding the mechanisms and functions of peasant class reproduction within capitalism will greatly aid in the transition out of it.

The work proceeds as follows: the first chapter, begins with the origins and developments of the

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\(^a\) It seems that the class transformative nature of primitive accumulation is central to its applicability in social science. Marx wrote that primitive accumulation is a, “process that transforms, on one hand, the social means of subsistence and production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage-labourers.” A relatively crisp distinction can then be made from accumulation that perpetuates existing class structures (accumulation proper) and accumulation which functions by means of class transformation (primitive accumulation).

A clear conception of primitive accumulation will allow a more nuanced evaluation of the persistence of non-wage labour within capitalism. This persistence has by no means been a static occurrence. Changes in the shape of these relations will continue to play a decisive role in future social, economic, and political development. It is essential that linguistic tools reflect this centrality.
agrarian question. After which, the current global food regime will be discussed. In chapter two, a theory of peasant class is proposed and positioned within the historical class debate. Chapter three establishes a counter-tendency to primitive accumulation and frames peasant persistence within capitalism. In chapter four, the contemporary empirical analysis begins by examining the population and demographics of the peasant class. Chapter five continues the empirical evaluation with a look into the forms of peasant land ownership, followed by, an investigation into land redistribution and enclosure trends. The sixth and final chapter investigates the tactics employed by peasant in defense of their livelihoods.

I. Setting the Stage

The Theoretic Origins of the Agrarian Question:

Peasant economy has long been viewed as central to understanding capitalism's birth and expansion. Investigating England, Marx observed, “the expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process.”¹ The agrarian question, in the words of Kautsky, sought to determine, “whether, and how, capital is seizing hold of agriculture, revolutionising it, making old forms of production and property untenable and creating the necessity for new ones.”²

This query was broadened and divided into three problematics within the literature: production, accumulation, and politics.³ The question of production focuses on the means by which capitalist relations penetrate the countryside and the impediments to this extension. While study is predominantly concerned with the transition to capitalism, some recent works have addressed movements away from differentiated commodity production, a process referred to as re-peasantization.⁴

The problematic of accumulation came to the fore after the establishment of the Soviet Union. The Union was presented with the challenge of industrializing a heavily rural economy. It was essential to define the role of agriculture in the creation of a vital industrial sector.⁵ The resulting Soviet experiments with agricultural surplus extraction fueled debate on the possible mechanisms and flows of accumulation between the rural/urban spheres.

Given the large population portion and the economically strategic position that food producers occupy, their political intentions have been extensively analyzed. The regularity of peasant rebellions in the last century validates this focus on class dynamics. Together, these three problematics form the pillars of agrarian economics, but new rural developments coupled with the extension of peasant studies into disciplines other than political economy has widened the field.
The Global Food Regime:

The globalization of agricultural markets, begun under colonization, accelerated following World War II. Green Revolution technologies and mechanization enabled rapid productivity increases. “Between 1950 and 1990, global cereal output nearly tripled...and the real price of rice, maize, and wheat dropped 60 percent between 1960 and the end of the last century.” The benefits of the Green Revolution have been unevenly distributed. Technologies focused towards large, mechanized mono-crop grain production. Regions either possessing high crop diversity or lacking input capital failed to gain. Much of Sub-Saharan Africa, where, “per capita agricultural output stagnated and even declined,” falls into both of these categories. Asia was more successful, with greater concentrations of grain production and widespread government subsidies. By in large, the Green Revolution deepened the divisions in farming, with high input farms producing at a 2000:1 ratio to low input units.

Following WWII, U.S. production increases were fueled by state subsidies. The resulting chronic grain surpluses of the mid-West found relief in the Marshall Plan and the expansion of USAid. Famine aid was supplied through the exportation of U.S. grain; while farmer support programs offered sterile hybrid (and now genetically modified) seeds to under-developed nations. These policies were, at times, supported by third-world governments desiring suppressed food prices to cheapened industrial labour costs. Ultimately, they destabilized agriculture in receiving countries. Local producers found themselves unable to compete with high input costs and low market prices. “This was the power that...converted the global South from generating trade surpluses in agricultural goods 40 years ago to being food deficit countries.” Pressure on small farm producers fed an unprecedented rise in migration; between 1950 and 1975 the number of rural third-world migrants increased by 230% when compared to the preceding 25 year period.

The debt crisis of the 1970s and 80s further consolidated the power of global agrarian capital. Structural adjustments, led by the IMF, forced the, “removal of agricultural subsidies and price supports, land deregulation, wage freezes, and devaluation of national currencies.” The resulting rapid inflation of input costs immiserated large numbers of farmers. Governments, strapped for foreign exchange, pushed for increases in cash crop production. Concurrently, “the share of agriculture in ODA (official development assistance) declined from 18 percent in 1979 to 3.5 percent in 2004.”

While the under-developed world was liberalizing, the United States and European Union maintained high domestic agricultural subsidizes. Such that, “in 2002...the price of US exports lagged
43 percent below cost of production for wheat, 25 percent for soybeans, 13 percent for maize, 61 percent for cotton, and 35 percent for rice.”


The other side of the market squeeze is the continued consolidation and financialization of food. In 2008, only 5 companies operated 90 percent of the world's grain trade. At the same time, inputs, e.g. fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, have become oligopolized. The net result is that value added from food production is only 10 percent of market price; this is down from 40 percent in 1900. The majority of the remaining value is divided between inputs (25 percent) and output processing (60 percent).

Financial speculation has led to rapid swings in global agricultural pricing. In, “December 2007, food prices were at their highest in real terms since 1846, the year The Economist began keeping track.” This is up from an all time low in 2001. The speculative nature of the hikes is clear; in a single day, March 27th, 2008, “the price of rice surged by 31 percent.” The intense centralization of the market inhibits producers from gaining wind-fall profits during peaks. While, the spikes tax the already thin foreign exchange of third-world food importing countries.

The New York Times predicts a tumultuous future:
“As with any commodity, questions of wheat shortages spur speculation and hoarding, and experts suggest both are at play in the current market. They believe more money is washing through the commodity market for wheat because with interest rates so low and the stock market so volatile, investors are putting their money in the Chicago Board of Trade.”

With sluggish real economy growth, speculation can be expected to increase, making food price swings a constant in the following years.

These result reveal the neo-liberal policy of export orientation as tragically flawed. The number of undernourished people in the world remains obstinately at one billion, this despite the continued growth in agricultural output. Hunger is endemic to the new global food regime. It is a result of unequal access, not underproduction. By some perverse logic, farming occupies the greatest proportion of workers in countries with high malnutrition rates. In the third-world as a whole, agriculture constitutes 9 percent of GDP and 50 percent of employment, but in countries with malnutrition rates of 33 percent or higher, agriculture contributes 30 percent of the GDP and 70 percent of employment.

The consolidation of the world agro-industry into input and output oligopolies strongly affects the ability of small producers to continue the profitable sale of their products. Despite demographic shifts away from the countryside, small producers, “still constitute two-fifths of humanity.” The global food regime thus threatens the livelihoods of the largest class in the world, an issue of no small import.

This crisis of production cannot be understood in isolation of the continued replication of the center/periphery divide. While peasants in the developed world have also suffered, “it is no coincidence that the bulk of the crisis... has been displaced...such that the social reproduction of the working class as a whole has continued to rely on the development of underdevelopment in the periphery.”

II: Class and Conflict

The Peasantry:

A discussion of class structure is necessary to position peasantry within modern capitalism. Three primary qualities are offered: the class has access to a means of production, which is not mitigated by wage relations; this means of production is particularly land and not capital per se; and labour is socially defined at the household, kin, or community level.1

To these three qualities one may suggest a fourth criteria, the endeavor for relative autonomy or subsistence. This is a difficult tautology; it separates entrepreneurial farmers from peasant farmers, not on objective conditions of their relationship to the means of production, but on the, “different ways in which the social and the material are patterned.”

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Under market forces peasants desiring wealth accumulation increasingly integrate themselves into trade and, if successful, employ expanding quantities of wage-labour and became capitalists. Conversely, those whom are pressured by market forces to sell their land and integrate into the proletariat either do so, or establish diverse mechanisms by which to mitigate the power of the market on their lives. The remaining group possesses a common desire to maintain their relation to their means of production. Thus, class is understood as a social economic construction, it is then not surprising that certain behavioral qualities internalize.

These four characteristics: non-wage labour, access to land, community/kin labour relations, and relative autonomy, tie together to create a complex, non-homogenous group. Peasants, at times, rely heavily on wage-labour in order to maintain their land base. Some access land, but only illegally and sporadically. Community labour relations can aid redistribution, but can just as easily take the form of parasitism, fueling differentiation. Autonomy is so culturally relative that no global litmus can be made. Still this class definition captures a social reality. The similarities are greater than the differences. The fate of these widely flung people relies on the same engines of economic growth and change.

Some theorists challenge the very existence of the peasant class. Henry Bernstein writes, “peasants become petty commodity producers...when they are unable to reproduce themselves outside the relations and processes of capitalist commodity production,” they are then, “capitalists because they own or have access to means of production... and workers because they use their own labour.”

Bernstein's position contends that, “because of... market integration, even simple reproduction of family farming enterprises requires high levels of competitiveness, hence continuous technical innovation and productivity growth,” endowing the firm with capitalist relations. This is not self-evident; a capitalist enterprise competes in a realm in which all inputs are market priced. Wage-labour, therefore, shapes and limits possible competitive space.

The absence of wage in peasant enterprise does have real behavioral affect. Because labour intensity is not determined by labour unit productivity, the application of labour follows a, somewhat, inverted logic when compared to capitalist firms. Peasants with diminishing holdings commit increasing labour intensity to maintain relative prosperity; as land holdings increase, yields per hectare are allowed to fall. So while a capitalist firm will invest as a means to increase relative surplus gains, peasant enterprises capitalize to avoid the costs associated with wage-labour. This, and other, behavioral differences will be discussed in greater detail later.

Given a different set of market forces (i.e. land redistribution, heavy subsidization) different behaviors will emerge.
Further, to accept Bernstein's contention is to deny the possibility of distinct *articulations* of modes of production, i.e. the co-existence of different class relations *within* enterprises in the same economic system.\(^7\) It is to suggest that the slavery of the American South was in fact a capital/wage-labour relation, simply because this relation was integrated into a capitalist dominated market.

**A note on access to land:**

The division between non-capitalist access to land and non-capitalist access to other means of production may seem arbitrary. They are, after all, both means of production and class definition revolves around the allocation and use of means of production. No distinction is made between agricultural and non-agricultural proletariats, so why one between peasants and the 'self employed' of the informal economy?

Most concretely, there is a difference in the nature of the production cycle. With a few exceptions, agricultural production is static, its timing is strictly controlled by local ecology. This has significant effects on the cultural and economic behavior surrounding it. Second, land is not a fluid resource in many parts of the world. Though less extreme, this also plays a role in the developed world.

Still, in the under-developed world the similarities between peasants and the informal 'self-employed' are greater than the differences. Empirically there is significant overlap and a certain symbiosis between the two groups. While it is not the task here, a careful investigation of the dynamics of this urban class and its interactions with capital is in order.

**Exploitation and class interest:**

The conflicts that arise between the peasantry and other classes are somewhat flexible and context specific. “These divergences do not arise from a mode of production specific to the peasantry themselves, but rather from their domination by and incorporation in the mode or modes prevalent in the social formation as a whole.”\(^8\) This is in sharp contrast to the directly antagonistic nature of the proletariat/capitalist divide. For the peasantry, capital's domination ebbs and flows with the fates of economic autonomy.

The peasant/proletariat relation is not exploitative, still a number of conflicts arise. Peasants often respond to destabilization by supplementing their incomes with migration; this drives down the wage floor. Further, their transitory nature makes organizing arduous, undercutting unionization
attempts. The spacial divide also plays an important role, particularly in states with very limited infrastructural funds, a focus on roads may come at the direct expense of sanitation efforts, for instance.

Conflicts play out in multifarious ways throughout the world. On the ground, many people represent a mix of many interests. The flows of people and goods between the classes blurs the mirror of prediction. The ability of peasants and proletariats to exploit or overcome their division will play a decisive role in the shaping of future anti-capitalist movements.

III: The Theoretic Basis of Peasant Persistence

Peasantization and De-Peasantization:

In Volume I of Capital Marx writes,

“The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realise their labour. As soon as capitalist production is on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale.”

Building on this foundation, Lenin fore-saw the complete eradication of the peasantry. Claiming that, “the fundamental and main trend of capitalism is the elimination of small-scale production by large-scale production both in industry and in agriculture.”

This logic finds supported in many contemporary theorists. Cousins, for instance, writes of, “the inherent tendency of small-scale rural producers to separate out into antagonistic classes of capital and labour.”

The reality is that peasant enterprises have not disappeared. Capitalism's past is ripe with examples of both peasantization and de-peasantization. The colonization of the United States' West by a newly formed peasant class, was the outcome of concerted governmental effort. The largest peasantization of the last century was the de-collectivization mandated by a Chinese government entering its capitalist phase.

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a Lenin did recognize this position as overly deterministic, writing, “the postulate...that capitalism requires a free, landless worker is often understood in too stereotyped a manner. The postulate is quite correct as indicating the main trend, but capitalism penetrates into agriculture particularly slowly, and in extremely varied forms...The type assumes different forms in different countries...Each...bear[s] traces of the special agrarian system, of the special history of agrarian relations in those countries.” (Pincus, pp. 38-39, 1996; quoting Lenin from The Development of Capitalism in Russia) Still in this caveat Lenin places all variation within the realm of historical specificity, thus the economic law remains untouched by criticism.

b Given the historical perseverance of the peasantry, it is now common for theorists to tautologically eliminate the class. See for instance Bernstein (1994)
De-peasantization also remains an important force of social change. In Thailand, between 1995 and 2003, “major production resources such as land were lost by... small farmers (over 1.5 million farming households either became landless or did not have enough farmland).”

Given the mixed history, it is not surprising that, “within peasant studies there is a major cleavage between those that advocate what Farshad Araghi designates the ‘disappearance thesis’ and those that support the ‘permanence thesis.’” The major failing of the disappearance thesis, as discussed above, is its impotence in explaining peasant expansions as anything more than extra-ordinary. As for the permanence thesis, it relies on the inability of capitalism to penetrate peasant production logic. Yet, it seems obvious that capitalism is capable of incorporating, through the market or otherwise, any means of production not protected by a strong state. Neither thesis can be accepted; the continued peasant presence is the result of space and time specific forces towards or away from proletarianization. Discerning these forces is necessary for an insightful comprehension of peasant development.

**Property Control:**

Marx believed, “that the continual tendency and law of development of the capitalist mode of production is more and more to divorce the means of production from labour.” This false prediction results from the synonymous use of extraction and production. If it is assumed that capitalists desire to increase extraction and not production per se, then it does not follow that means of production must be owned and centralized. The preference for direct or indirect extraction correlates to a number of factors.

First, risk variability, some production is by its nature much less predictable- in these circumstances, capitalists may choose to position themselves around the sight of production. This is the case in many mining ventures, where the resource is often state-owned and extraction variability is placed on workers through commission earnings.

Second, inherent production decentralization- these industries rely on immovable markets or natural resources. The scattered sights, massively increase oversight and infrastructure costs, making it more profitable to control the input and output markets. Many forest products, as well as, in-home services fall into this category. Decentralization also applies to single locations. Large farm size makes wage-labour inefficient. Similarly, hand harvesting fruits and vegetables, limits economies of scale.

Third, a disconnection between labour time and production time due to a reliance on reproductive cycles. While technological advances can increase absolute outputs, they cannot increase turnover. In agriculture, during the growing season capital is locked and cannot realize the profits
generated by labour.⁷

Fourth, relative illiquidity of investment- land being the most stark example. The more removed from urban centers, the thinner the real estate market. So while return on investment may be good, there are limited exit options if it is not.⁸ Finance offers the other extreme.

Fifth, irregular labour productivity curves- such as fine craft-work, which do not respond to technological innovation. Productivity is static or even declining with intensification. Fruit and vegetable farming follows this declining rate of return (the Classical economics labour market model).

Given these deterrents, incomplete market formation, even in the most developed capitalist states, and petty bourgeois and peasant perseverance, even during severe investment shortages, is less surprising. In fact, the systemic tendency seems to be towards indirect control rather than away from it, as can be attested to by the massive growth of finance capital.

**Persistence:**

The peasantry's mode of production goes far in explaining their persistence. Rural land holdings and agricultural production fall into all five categories above and are generally undesirable for capital investment. Some animal products are the exception to this rule. Hormone and feed advances shortened the life-cycles of domestic animals; antibiotics overcome density restrictions allowing for factory production. Still, animal husbandry illustrates the same indirect ownership tendencies in production processes that resist mechanization. Cattle feed lots and slaughter houses are tightly controlled by capitalists while birthing and pasturing remain within the purview of peasants.

At times, capital has chosen to invest directly in agricultural, but these purchase often do not result in capitalist production. Instead, rent agreements are usually preferred over wage-labour, leaving peasants to operate the means of production.

Yet, the process of de-peasantization need not result from a capitalist requirement for agricultural means of production. The European enclosures were driven as much by the desire for the 'doubly free' industrial worker.⁹ Class transformations can root as easily in labour shifts as in means of production shifts. That said, capitalism has no need for more industrial labour, with the world's slums growing at 25 million a year, the number of destitute and unemployed has never been greater.⁹

Presently, the peasantry of the periphery are not likely to experience a class transformation, they

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⁷ In recent debates, enclosure has become a widely and loosely used term; referring to processes as divergent as taxation, debt, and land acquisition. If the word is to retain meaning, some clarification is necessary.

⁸ For the purposes here a more conventional use of the term enclosure will be employed. As defined by Merriam-Websters, to enclose is, “to close in: surround, to fence off (common land) for individual use, to hold in: confine” (Merriam-Webster online dictionary, 2010). Here, both the processes by which common land is enclosed and those by which private, but non-capitalist land holdings are seized and converted will be analyzed as modes of enclosure.
are simply more valuable in their current position than if they were forced into the informal economy. First, the relative productivity gains represented by investment in the urban informal economy are much greater than those in agriculture, due to their present low levels. Second, large scale enclosure would shift the risks associated with agricultural production onto capital. And third, in states struggling to maintain legitimacy, in the face of declining standards of living, the peasantry offer a potential ally.

The access to productive assets makes the peasantry more conservative than their informal counterparts, despite higher rates of absolute poverty in most of the rural world. Numerous studies have illustrated, “that vulnerability is directly linked to the reliability of income and/or food sources, rather than the quantity earned,” giving peasants more to lose.¹⁰

Instead of witnessing a period of de-peasantization in coming years, it seems likely that agro-industrial capital will tighten its hold, forcing an increasing proportion of the peasant population to diversify income in order to subsidize agricultural production.

IV: Peasantry- People and Place

Populations:

Despite dramatic evocations of peasant disappearance, they remain the largest demographic group in the world. Any numerical discussion of such a diverse population will be riddled with methodological problems. High rates of migration, informality, landlessness, and informal slums make accurate statistical analysis impossible. A series of recent studies have attempted to shed light on the global developments of urbanization, poverty, and rural demographics, but leave a number of questions unanswered. Still, general trends can be assessed and conclusions drawn with regards to the future composition of the world.

Currently, 6.6 billion people live on the planet. Population is expected to peak at around 9.4 billion in 2050, but variations in projections put the final number as low as 7.7 billion and as high as 11.1 billion.¹ Mike Davis places the urban world population at 3.2 billion, constituting approximately half of the world population.²

The continued prevalence of the peasantry has been largely under-emphasized. Eric Hobsbawm declared, “the death of the peasantry,” in his Age of Extremes, but this represents, at best, a half-truth. Rapid urbanization has caused a dramatic decline in the percentage of rural peoples. “By 1950, still 70 percent of the total world population, and 82 percent of the Third World population, lived in rural areas. Today 55 percent of the world population...lives in rural areas.”³ While the growth of cities certainly

¹ Piece-meal statistics from various sources do not create an internally rigorous image. The reader must forgive slight numerical inconsistencies for the sake of a deeper comprehension of the phenomenon at hand.
represents an important demographic shift, these proportional statistics are often misapplied. They are used to justify images of, “mass flight from the countryside.” And a popular 'enclosure narrative' reliant on the observation that, “a massive number of the world's people have been dispossessed, uprooted and displaced.” Proportional growth measures internal composition and cannot, by itself, suggest mass flight or dispossession, a look at general growth trends illustrates the fallacy.

During the second half of the twentieth century the global population grew at a remarkable rate, doubling in 40 years. Despite massive third-world urbanization rates, “(3.8 percent per annum from 1960 to 1993),” rural populations increased. “In 1970 the world's agricultural population stood at 2.0 billion, while [in] 2010 it will have grown to 2.6 billion.” The growth of urban environments does not represent the emptying of the countryside, but instead a relatively slow rural population growth.

While rural birth rates are systemically higher than those encountered in urban environments, migration has largely off-set this expansion. Rural/urban migration accounts for, 50 to 65 percent of urban growth. Yet, the forces which contribute to rural out-flows have not stopped rural growth, but have acted as relief mechanisms in light of high birth rates, declining agricultural profit margins, and declining average farm size (to be discussed in detail in the following chapter).

**Figure III: Agricultural Population By Region**

![Agricultural Population By Region](source.png)

*Source: Weis*
Urban/rural migration patterns continue to affect rural population levels. Mike Davis writes, “the global countryside...has reached its maximum population and will begin to shrink after 2020.” This is a contentious position; his analysis relies on extrapolating earlier urbanization trends, but there is reason to believe that the rate of urbanization has begun to decline. Davis sights a 3.8 percent annual third-world urban growth rate between 1960 and 1993, but a recent survey of 58 under-developed countries found only a 10.1 percent growth in urbanization for the entire period 1980-2001. World Urbanization Prospects (2005) predicted that 60 percent of the developing world would reside in cities by 2030, but these publications have overestimated past urban growth. Bocquier's methodology places the urban share at only 49 percent by that date.

Part of the divergence in prediction can be explained by the complexity involved in comparing demographic data and definitions across the globe. Most countries employ no numerical measure of 'urban' and even among those that do, the minimum size ranges from as little as 500 to as many as 20,000 people. Attempts at accuracy are further frustrated by the prevalence of circular migration and multi-spacial families. And finally, the rural landless population are often missed by census methods which rely heavily on house surveys.

Despite the large variation, it seems likely that urban growth will continue to absorb the majority of rural population growth. But contrary to Davis' contention, rural populations will likely continue to grow in absolute terms in the next decades.

This rural growth expectation is, in part, attributable to the continuation of high fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. Populations in the region are expected to double (in some countries even triple) by 2050. The sub-continent is only 35 percent urban, and despite high urbanization rates, has a growing rural population. Of the 35 countries with high fertility rates, 31 are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The stability of these rates in the face of a global fertility decline has been largely attributed to the continued desire for large families, a population momentum heavily linked to rurality.

**Demographic trends:**

High migration rates have led some authors to express concern with the feminization of the countryside. It is suggested that this trend has negative effects on the overall productivity of farming activities due to the physically intensive nature of the work. While the logic is contentious, it is obvious that swings in femininity will detrimentally effect community development.

Fortunately, most of the rural world has not experienced systemic feminization. The exception
being Sub-Saharan Africa, where rural femininity is on the rise. It is unclear how this affects agricultural productivity in the region, since women have traditionally grown most crops and migration tends to be circular. On the other hand, feminization can be expected to increase household inequality due to the relatively low earnings of female-headed homes.

Around the world, rural dependency ratios are higher than their urban counterparts. This has a significant effect on cultural formation and poverty levels. A large body of research has confirmed a strong positive correlation between dependency ratios and incidence of poverty. Thankfully, rural dependency has been declining globally. There are a few exceptions to this rule in countries with high rates of: HIV/AIDS infection or migration, where dependency has actually increased slightly.

Fears of falling rural productivity due to migration and HIV/AIDS are largely unfounded. While stable demography is a good sign this should not be used to suggest that either of the afore mentioned phenomena have no negative effect on rural communities. On the contrary, migration and disease are undermining social reproduction in much of the rural world. This coupled with the continuation of high rates of dependency suggests a difficult road out of poverty.

V: Accessing the Means of Production

Modes of ownership:
Agriculture occupies, “4.4 billion hectares, over 50 percent of the earth's surface area.” While the bulk of those working this land are peasants, their access is mitigated by a variety of legal and social circumstances. Three forms of 'ownership' prevail: non-protected land ownership- these farmers lack both social and legal backing for their claim and are often considered landless participating in shifting agriculture and wild-harvesting; socially or legally recognized private ownership- these individuals work a stable land portion, which can often be transferred through sale; and communal land ownership- land is granted by local authorities and is not sellable, but may or may not be inheritable.

The presence of landless peasant populations is not a new phenomenon. Landlessness has been a pervasive feature of portions of Asia for hundreds of years. In the early, “nineteenth century...an estimated 30-50% of the population of Java had no land.” Similarly, in India, the caste system coupled with colonial relations resulted in high rates of rural landlessness.

Latin America has the most unequal land distribution of any region. Colonial investment centered around the production of cash crops for European export. These large farms (latifundistas) at their peak concentrated 80 percent of land under 5 percent of owners. This system left, “approximately
one-third of the agricultural labour force...landless.” In Brazil alone, the Landless Rural Workers Movement, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), estimates that 4.5 million peasants are without land.5

Interestingly, landlessness is not a common feature in Sub-Saharan Africa. “In many states, manipulating access to land was not a key factor in realising national colonial or post-colonial state imperatives, and peasant agricultural was encouraged.”6 The low population density and communal land structure of much of the region enabled people to remain landed despite large seizures by European corporations. The so-called 'transition countries' also have low levels of landlessness due to the recent dissolution of large state-cooperative farms into small peasant estates.7

The global number of rural landless or near landless ranges between 500 million and 1 billion.8 The bush-meat trade, slash and burn farming, and the steady movement of people into high elevation forests have put considerable strain on local ecosystems. In 1989, approximately three-fifths of tropical deforestation was attributable to peasant slash and burn agriculture.9 The contested plane between marginalized agricultural peoples and protected ecosystems will play an increasing role in coming years as circumstances on both sides become more dire.10 Despite this groups social and numerical significance research to date is notably thin.

Outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, the majority of the agricultural population is landed under a private property system. The legal formality of these property rights varies significantly across regions. “The Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) estimated that as much as 75 percent of all real estate parcels in Egypt do not have efficient formalized titles.”11 On the other end of the spectrum, in Western Europe and the United States virtually all land is held under written claim.

Global governance organizations, e.g. IMF, World Bank, have long supported titling schemes as a means to unlock 'dead capital', bolster productivity and, “lift millions out of poverty.”12 Despite their enthusiasm, market led land reform has not been widely successful and the extension of land titling almost ubiquitously leads to increases in inequality and poverty.13

No where have titling schemes failed more dramatically than Sub-Saharan Africa. “In Kenya... it is estimated that 90 per cent of all land in farming districts had been privatized by 1993. Today, however, 'there is considerable evidence of reversion to customary tenure in titled areas.'14 In Namibia, the disturbance of traditional property rights resulted in rapid environmental degradation.15 The sub-continent has largely resisted the process of land market formation and communal land tenure systems still dominate distribution. This is not to say that colonization and the extension of capitalism have not
penetrated traditional land systems. It is simply, that land regimes have adapted more than died out.  

Ownership trends:

In addition to land tenure, land holding inequality, population change, land redistribution, and enclosure all have dramatic effect on the world's peasantry. These measures and the processes surrounding them, not only dictate the environment in which peasant families must survive, but also set the stage for the growth or decline of the peasant class.

Land holding inequality is strongly linked to the growth of rural income pluriactivity and migration, as well as low productivity growth rates. Unfortunately, attempts to measure land holding inequality encounter serious constraints and there is limited availability of reliable time-series data.

First, some surveys measure land ownership, while others assess land holding (the portion of land accessible to a producer). The difference in these measures can be dramatic. Second, most measures of inequality do not account for differences in land quality. This skews data in areas with uneven irrigation or rainfall. Third, most land data is collected by household. This is problematic given the large variance in household size. Finally, landless rural households tend to be overlooked in landholding surveys. This can create the impression of very equitable holdings despite great access disparity. Due to these limitations, international comparisons are difficult and dangerous to draw, it is far more illuminating to evaluate single country time series.

Assessing the quantity of land under peasant control meets a set of tautological challenges. Smallholder and peasant enterprise are not synonymous; while smallholders are almost all peasants, not all peasants land owners are smallholders. First, the necessary size of a farm is relative to the crop produced and the technologies employed. As Cathleen Kneen notes, Canadian farms are measured by the section (259 hectares) and, “a small farm which might be expected to earn a living for the farm family is several hundred acres.” These scales are out of proportion with standard definitions of smallholder. Second, even in the under developed world, 'smallholder' does not capture the extent of peasant holdings; smallholders being defined at 2 hectares (at times 1.6 hectares). This cutoff discounts middle sized peasant farmers, as well as, beneficiaries of land reforms in more land abundant areas.

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a In the United States, the number of individual farm enterprises has dropped by 72% since 1930, but land concentration has not preceded apace. Instead, “roughly 55 percent of farmland is now operated by owner-renters who are for the most part small producers” (Lewontin, pp. 94, 2000).

b 2 hectares is used by Headey et al. (2008), 1.6 is the definition employed by Anriquez and Bonomi (2007)
Figure VI: Changes in Average Farm Size and Number of Small Farms: Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Average Farm Size (hectares)</th>
<th>Number of Small Farms (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>49.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>84.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>92.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>17.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1971–73</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>12.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>17.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>189.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Circa 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>340.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Headey, et al. (2008)

None the less, some trends can be assessed. Across Southeast Asia, there is a ubiquitous expansion of the number of small farms and simultaneously a decline in the average size of farms. This proliferation is in keeping with the expansion of the peasant population. If there has been no change in the total land area of peasant enterprise then this trend has resulted in increasing countryside inequality.

From the table below it is not possible to determine the affect of land reform or enclosure on peasant holdings. Writing for the World Bank, Anriquez and Bonomi have attempted to assess the net result of these two forces on 17 countries. Though the data set is unfortunately small, the breadth of the results suggests a very differentiated global process. No clear trend can be determined; grouping
countries by region, economic status, or GDP growth all lead to a dead end. It seems, the forces effecting the relative strength of land reform and enclosure are highly contingent on local struggles.

Figure VII: Change in Land Under Smallholder Control

Source: Anriquez and Bonomi (2007)²²

Brazil offers some insight into the significance and complexity of domestic factors. The country has one of the most unequal land distributions in the world. Holdings of over 1000 hectares occupy 50 percent of agricultural land, but account for only 1.4 percent of farms.²³ Within this setting, in 1984, the Landless Peoples Movement (MST) was born. Using confrontational land occupation tactics this group has forced the re-allocation of over 25,000 hectares, settling over 500,000 families.²⁴ Yet, despite these gains, the concentration of land has continued, driven by a grain export model. Between 1995 and 1998, 450,000 rural properties disappeared,” while, “approximately 200,000 families resettled.”²⁵

The lack of a clear enclosure trend supports the conclusion that capitalism does not structurally desire the destruction of the peasantry at this juncture. A more detailed evaluation of land reform and enclosure pressures will be conducted below. First, it is necessary to briefly turn to the issue of land fragmentation.

Land fragmentation occurs when the number of small farms is increasing faster than the growth of land under smallholder cultivation. This systemic decline in farm size will invariably lead to
increases in migration and off-farm employment. Again, the available data does not paint a clear picture. Given the stagnancy of formal employment and the vulnerability of the informal economy, it seems likely that fragmentation will be a deepening problem in many countries of the third-world. This process can be expected to drive circular migration, but also land productivity as farmers seek to stabilize yields on declining landholdings.

**Land Reform:**

Restricting access to land is an important means by which capital controls the flow of labour supply. It is not surprising that this is a point of contested terrain. What is surprising, from a classical Marxist perspective, is that the revolutionary egalitarian and socialist conflicts of the last century have almost all occurred around this node. After WWII, Chinese communism awoke the capitalist world to the threat posed by feudalism and unequal land distribution. Under the military authority of the U.S., Japan and South Korea (followed closely by Taiwan) underwent dramatic land re-distributions. In Latin America, the U.S. led Alliance for Progress, oversaw land reform throughout the region. The express goal of these policies was the co-optation of discontent and the establishment of a conservative rural petty bourgeoisie. In Africa, liberation movements, organized by local elites, fueled discontent in rural peoples to ignite revolution. There, land redistribution became a standard feature of post-independence reform.

The 1990s witnessed a unique historical juncture with the transformation of the Soviet bloc. This resulted in state-led land reform in the name of privatization, a very different breed of redistribution than earlier movements against capitalism.

With the rise of neo-liberalism came market-led agrarian reform (MLAR). This movement has contributed little to the expansion of smallholdings within the last 20 years. The World Bank's Land Credit and Poverty Reduction Programme in Brazil is a good example, receiving significant funding (US$400 million), but producing, at best, questionable outcomes. At times, as in Peru, MLAR has contributed to the net enclosure of peasant lands. Given the mixed results, it is difficult to consider MLAR a movement for land reform despite its prominence within official circles.

Peasants throughout the world have continued to press for land using political pressure and extra-legal means. Land occupations are pervasive in Africa (Zimbabwe, South Africa), Asia (Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia), and Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Guatemala). Unrest in the countryside is not new, what is unique is the 'anti-political' nature of current actions. Distance from
political parties and a lack of intention to control state power are both common features of contemporary movements. In his book, *Change the World Without Taking Power*, John Holloway contends this development is a recognition of the inherently capitalist nature of 'state' in modern society. Following a more applied logic, Moyo and Yeros, “argue that the lesson to be learned is...that the task...is to build self-sufficient peasant-worker movements that can withstand imperialism at the levels of both civil society and the state.”

These interpretations underestimate the continuing significance of state power. If a government obstinately opposes peasant demands and aggressively responds to illegal actions there would be little choice, but to seek state power. It is the acquiescence of state apparatuses which diffuse conflict before it gains destabilizing momentum.

The ability of contemporary governments to bend to the requirements of peasant movements stems from both the growth of international capital and the extended presence of the informal economy. The first contributes to the declining strength of local landed capital as national elite move their holdings into international markets. Land disputes no longer pose the threat to income they once did.

As for the growth of the informal economy, it offers both a carrot and a stick. First, peasant production is far more exploitable, and therefore profitable, than informal work. Second, without the support or at least silence of the rural population, governments risk loosing control to a peasant/informal coalition. Finally, given the heavy flow of resources between rural and urban environments, a strong peasant population offers a stabilizing force against the revolutionary strength of urban movements. The anti-statism of recent peasant groups cannot be understood as a post-modern development nor as the sudden recognition of the true dangers of co-optation. It is instead the result of structural changes which have limited capitalists' stake and increased peasants' relative value to capital.

Recent government actions well support these conclusions. In Brazil, the MST's land seizures have been formalized into the workings of the *Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária* (INCRA). “Land occupations are technically illegal, but in practice they are supported by state officials who have come to see the occupations as either a 'necessary evil' or a normal part of the process, replete with forms to be filled out and people designated to negotiate with the offenders.” In Zimbabwe, the spread of land occupations was co-opted by the government through constitutional amendments and the Land Acquisition Act. India's passage of the Rural Employment Guarantee Act, though not land reform, operates in a similar fashion by redistributing wealth and stability towards rural populations. In the Philippines, occupation struggles have pressured for more extensive and rapid
implementation of the CARP land redistribution law.\textsuperscript{34}

These various legal frameworks illustrate states' willingness to incorporate peasant demands. This is a marked divergence from earlier peasant struggles, which often resulted in open armed conflict. During the Cold War, land reform was a political strategy of the United States in order to stem the growth of communism. Local elite were forced to acquiesce against their will.\textsuperscript{35} In the current phase, national governments are seeking these legal compromises of their own volition.

This argument is not meant to imply that land reform results are embedded in state responses. Civil struggle interacts with bureaucratic struggle to produce temporally specific compromises. “Land reform is popular because it delivers 'more' land, 'large' lands, 'enough' lands - enough land to grow enough food to eat and/or a surplus for sale.”\textsuperscript{36} So long as land scarcity is a concern, popular farm struggles will shape the political landscape. The opportunities afforded to local elite will in many ways dictate the path these struggles take.

The countries in transition have embarked on large scale land reform as part of a move towards capitalism. The shock of liberalization caused a dramatic retraction of GDP throughout the Soviet states. Poverty sky-rocketed and populations ruralized, with agriculture's share in employment and GDP increasing into the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{37} As states disbanded large collective farms, peasant agriculture spread in the countryside. In Armenia, around 330,000 individual family plots were allocated, while pastureland was transferred to local communities in common.\textsuperscript{38} Uzbekistan witnessed a similar process, with 82 percent of the total population granted access to small farm plots.\textsuperscript{39}

While these small peasant holdings initially cushioned populations against economic recession, poverty rates in urban areas are once again below those found in the countryside. This reversal is explained by deteriorating agricultural terms of trade, strong urban bias, and limited access to credit. These factors have inhibited the rural population from producing at their full potential and from reaping the benefits of crop surpluses. The experience of Soviet reform illustrates clearly the need for granting peasants support beyond access to land.\textsuperscript{40}

**Enclosure:**

The driving forces of enclosure under neo-liberal capitalism are diverse. Urbanization, the growth of environmental reserves, and large infrastructural projects are all placing continued pressure on farm land. Further, it seems that agricultural is at a crossroads. Since the turn of the century, but most dramatically since the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble and the onset of the 2008 food crisis,
two new processes have emerged. One is the purchasing or leasing of land by food dependent countries to ensure cheap imports. The second is the increasing financialization of agriculture investment.

The massive expansion of cities within the last 30 years has resulted in the unlanding of a great number of peasants. Davis records that, “in India more than 50,000 hectares of valuable croplands are lost every year to urbanization.” Similarly, “Cairo...consumes up to 30,000 hectares a year.” Though not to be taken lightly, the growth of slums is ultimately the consolidation of rural population growth. Urban growth can not be seen as a tool of enclosure, enclosure is instead a by-product of this process.

Environmental reserves continue to be the location of contested land ownership. An estimated 8.5 million people have been evicted from protected areas globally in the last decades. Large reserves are formed in 'empty' areas in the name of biodiversity and reforestation, but these tracks are rarely in fact without human population. In Chiapas, Mexico the Montes Azules biosphere reserve is the focus of a highly charged dispute between the Zapatista liberation army and the federal government. After establishing a 'zone of influence' in 1994, a number of Zapatista villages sprung up within the reserve. The state has since been negotiating the relocation of the populations. But matters are still more complicated due to the initial presence of Lacandón Indians. These peoples are native to the region and now occupy the most exploited position in the conflict as invisibles.

A twist on this process has been the establishment of large private eco-reserves by the mega-rich. During the 1990s, wealthy U.S. Americans and Europeans purchased almost the entirety of Patagonia in Argentina. The enclosure of forest lands limits resource availability for the worlds poor who rely on wood for heat and cooking (these uses accounted for 80 percent of roundwood harvested globally in 1994). So while this process may not directly unland, it often contributes to a decline in resource entitlement.

Development projects are the final long-standing process driving land enclosure. These include infrastructure works, as well as, Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and industrial centers. The World Bank estimates that in 2000, “some 10 million people were displaced in China, India, Thailand, and Cambodia for the sake of economic growth.” Again the impact of this process on the peasant class is difficult to assess. Most SEZs and other industrial infrastructure are placed close to available trade routes and labour populations. They develop in the peri-urban areas and their establishment results primarily in the eviction of informal urban residents, such as the impending destruction of the Dharavi slum in Mumbai. While there is a large overlap between these urban peoples and peasants, the structural effect is not direct. On the other hand, infrastructural works often target rural populations, the
Three Gorges Dam in China being one of the most prominent recent examples.

The rapid rise of grain prices in 2008 unsettled food importing countries across the globe. For many governments it became clear that the continued reliance on foreign food producers was untenable. They searched abroad for purchasable or rent-able crop lands whose fruits could be directly imported. The number of countries which have participated in the foreignization of their agricultural production is difficult to determine. Land acquisitions are typically kept quite due to their politically charged nature. The planned sale of 1.3 million hectares in Madagascar to a South Korean company has been strongly connected to the eventual coup d'etat. Nevertheless, a laundry list of states have participated in these land grabs including: China, Malaysia, Egypt, Bahrain, India, Jordan, Qatar, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia.

Further complicating matters, land acquisitions often are conducted by semi-independent investment agencies. Drawing clean distinctions between attempts at food independence and financial speculation is difficult. Financial corporations such as Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs are financing meat production in China. While a Swedish investment group, Black Earth Farming has, “acquired control of 331,000 ha of farmland in the black earth region of Russia.” Investment vehicles have sprung up throughout Africa, offering 15-25 percent yearly returns on a 10 year horizon. This is quite a remarkable development, never before has farm land acted as a large sink for financial capital. The recent trend is all the more stark when contrasted with the historic development of the United States, where still only 1 percent of farms and farmland are operated for absentee owners.

The net result of these land grabs is impossible to determine. The World Bank supports the developments as a healthy means of attracting FDI, contending that land sales are a win-win situation. Yet according to the Banks most recent study on the matter, 'Rising Global Interest in Farmland', gains for local governments have been minimal. Despite limited empirical analysis, it seems safe to assume that the speculation trend will continue; leading to land and grain price inflation until the bubble bursts and prices fall. This is a dangerous scenario for the world's food supply. On the upswing, many poor will be forced to survive on less. Yet, the decline could be even more destabilizing if it leads to rapid under-utilization during the period of capital flight. This outcome is in no way predetermined. Governments around the world have already begun strengthening laws against land speculation. Still, the power balance is not equal and if capital desires an outcome, poor countries will likely acquiesce.

It is not at all clear how this process is effecting the globe's peasantry. GRAIN contends that,

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Brazil recently closed foreign ownership loopholes in its legislation. Kenyan voters adopted a constitution which will outlaw foreign ownership. For information on Brazil see Colitt, Ewing (2010), for Kenya see Makau (2010).
“these lands will be transformed from smallholdings or forests, whatever they may be, into large industrial estates connected to large far-off markets,” but this analysis is rather weak.\textsuperscript{54} Land grabs have focused almost exclusively on animal, oil, and grain production; these are traditionally the most centralized and capitalized agricultural products. Thus, \textit{prima facia} it is impossible to assess the impact of these purchases on distribution and centralization.

That is not to contend that the movement is occurring without peasant dispossession. Mainstream analysis often purports that much of Africa is empty and uncultivated (Reuters claims a 20 percent arable land cultivation rate for the sub-continent).\textsuperscript{55} These conclusions are rooted in a Euro-centric conception of use and property rights, on the ground, there is little untended land.\textsuperscript{56} The result may be the dispossession of pastoralists whom, by official accounts, have never existed.

The five land enclosure processes identified have differing roots, effects, and time horizons. By far the most dynamic and uncertain enclosure forces are foreignization and financialization. These trends may support and then limit each other within the next decade. First, foreignization is only politically feasible so long as prices remain stable. The \textit{coup} in Madagascar lends evidence to this thesis. Food riots were a common feature of the third-world in 2008. The intensity of these conflicts in Egypt led to the call for a general strike against the Mubarak government.\textsuperscript{57} The recent hike in wheat prices has brought riots again, with dozen dead and 400 injured within two days in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{58}

All things being equal, if productivity gains are managed then there is no reason to assume chronic price instability, but financialization is a wild card. This second trend has as its aim rapid price inflation. And like so many things in capitalism, commodity price inflation is a self fulfilling prophecy. If the last two bubbles are any indication, then speculation in land will froth and peak sometime in the next 5 to 10 years. The very thing on which financialization depends, may undermine foreignization attempts.

\textbf{VI: Peasant Resistance}

The lifestyle choices of peasants has shifted with the decline of their relative farm income. Due to the strength of the agro-industry and the scarcity of land in most parts of the world, farmers are often not capable of supporting themselves through own-farming alone. In response to these economic pressure peasants have: redefined markets, sought alternative forms of income, and established collective means of resistance.
Redefining Markets:

Peasants shape their market reality by de-commoditizing the production process and extending autonomous markets. De-commoditization results in remarkable shifts in all portions of production. As discussed earlier, the primacy of non-market labour relations is a defining feature of peasant livelihood. Two techniques are commonly employed to defend this relation. In developed countries, mechanization expands nuclear family production potential; while in under-developed nations, communities supply labour through complex networks of obligation and reciprocity. In both instances, the real cost of labour is suppressed below market levels, allowing the farm to withstand the agro-business price squeeze and competition.¹

The self-provisioning of inputs further aids the stability of peasant farms. The high costs of seeds and fertilizers are avoided by the development of local plant varieties and the integration of organic soil supplements. Closed circuit agriculture was traditionally necessary, but since the Green Revolution this is no longer the case. In the context of alternatives to self-provisioning, the practice's continuation indicates a strategic choice.²

Self-provisioning is prolific throughout the peasant world. A survey by IMPACT, covering seven European countries, concluded, “that 60 percent of professional farmers are actively engaged in cost-reduction through greater self-provisioning, which contribute[s] at least 5.7 billion Euros per year to the agrarian incomes realised in these countries.”³

A related process is manifest in the investment patterns of peasant farmers. A number of studies illustrate the tendency among smallholders to rely on savings over debt.⁴ This is not an abstract preference, but one which concretely effects the development of production. A step-by-step approach to capitalization is utilized, which often relies on off-farm work as a means of generating necessary savings. Purchases that enter the farm through 'own-money' no longer operate as commodities. Because it is not necessary for the equipment to replicate its value within production, its primary relation becomes that of a use-value, one that improves the conditions of labour.⁵

Farm capitalization is not an exit from the peasantry. Instead, capitalization contributes to the tenacity of this class. The positive correlation between capital intensity and self-sufficiency has been well illustrated in the United States.⁶ A similar pattern has been observed in Latin America, where small-farms have much higher capitalization rates than their large capitalist-farm counterparts.⁷

In many parts of the world, the absence of good data makes the claim of preferential self-financing difficult to validate. The limited penetration and high cost of finance in some countries
further obscures economic preferences. Still, a body of evidence suggests that independence is being sought with own investment in least developed countries. There is, for instance, a positive relationship between access to urban remittances and high farm productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa, this despite agriculture's absolute income stagnancy.8

Another important trend in farm de-commoditization is the extension of on-farm value adding. When peasants: acquire mechanical skills for farm repairs; build barns, silos, ponds, houses; or perform veterinary services on livestock; they extend the non-commodity nature of peasant labour into a wider circuit of production. Outputs are also augmented. Raw food inputs are processed into a great range of final products before they leave the homestead. In addition, farmers sell an image, advertising their lifestyle as 'sustainable', 'free trade', and 'family farm', in this way transforming their mystic into market value. The IMPACT study sited earlier, found that 51 percent of professional European farmers engage in on-farm output processing, contributing 5.9 billion Euros worth of value per year in the seven countries surveyed.9

Beyond the farm, peasants protect themselves from oligopolies by extending autonomous market spaces. This process takes a divergent, yet overlapping, course in the North and South. In the developed world, autonomous markets are markets in the classical sense: spaces in which producers and consumers meet to exchange goods for money. The recent growth of 'farmer's markets' represent a remarkable reversal in food relations. In 1994, there were 1,755 farmers markets in the United States, by 2009 this number had grown to 5,274.10 By this means, the neo-liberal food regime is circumvented by direct sale, distributing value towards producers.

Farmers markets also occur in the global South, but their presence and number is highly contingent on regular access to buyers. Own food provisioning takes a more dominant role in areas with irregular prices or poorly valued currencies. A survey conducted in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi found that for, “peasant households, the physical output share of principal food crops retained for home consumption rather than sold in the market was routinely found to be above 70 per cent.”11 In addition, “rural links...become vital safety-valves and welfare options for urban people who are very vulnerable to economic fluctuations.”12 In Windhoek, Namibia, 66 percent of respondents receive food from their rural relatives and of these 91 percent rated this contribution between important and critical to survival. It is interesting that, in Windhoek, these rural-urban connections survive regardless of the

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8 In addition to farmer's markets, Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) programs have sprung up throughout the global North (12,549 registered in the U.S. in 2007) (USDA pp. 606 (2007). In CSAs, farmers are paid at the beginning of the year for fresh produce that they deliver during the growing season.
length of migration and continue into the second, city-born, generation.\textsuperscript{13}

The focus on family reproduction is not unique to Africa.\textsuperscript{b} Peasants surveyed in China did not consider farming an 'economic activity'. Agriculture was pursued: primarily for family consumption needs, secondarily as life insurance, and finally as money generating. This focus shifts cultivation patterns; one farmer explained planting a large corn plot, instead of more peanuts, by corn's multi-functionality: it can be eaten, used as feed, traded, burned for heat, and used as fertilizer; whereas peanuts are only good for eating and oil.\textsuperscript{14}

The prioritization of use-value is also evident in states of the former Soviet Union. In Armenia, “widespread access to land, provid[es people with] the capability to produce food for househol[d] consumption.”\textsuperscript{15} In Uzbekistan, 82 percent of the population has access to small subsistence plots.\textsuperscript{16} The general economic collapse of the region in the 1990s resulted in a rise of self-provisioning, but also an increase in barter trade, further separating markets from capitalist monetary logic.\textsuperscript{17}

The use of de-commoditization and autonomous markets make peasants' incomes more resilient to economic fluctuations. It is not surprising that market flight has historically intensified in periods of crisis, e.g. 1880, 1930.\textsuperscript{18} Evidence suggests that the contemporary crisis has been met with a similar distantiation.\textsuperscript{19} This trend represents a global re-peasantization from below.

**Alternative Income:**

In addition to tactics designed to mitigate or define the market, peasants also seek alternative income as a means to insure their reproduction. At times income diversification can be achieved through farm multi-functionality (energy production, agro-tourism), but most often farmers must seek labour markets. Generally, off-farm work experiences are divided between those occurring locally and those requiring migration. Local work can be further split into rural agricultural, rural non-farm, and urban employment.

It is difficult to determine the scope of rural farm employment, as data is thin. Surveys in North and Central Mozambique indicate that agricultural labour is the most common form of paid work for peasant farmers. Further, a majority of the wage labour events in the area occurred on nearby peasant farms.\textsuperscript{20} These conclusions can, of course, not be universalized, but they show that direct agricultural employment is at times significant to the income of peasants and must not be over-looked.

Rural non-farm employment is considered a central component of an effectively developing

\textsuperscript{b} As used here, family takes on a much wider meaning than common in the European cultural setting and should be understood to include a broad kin network.
countryside. Again, comparative research is lacking, yet some observations can be made. Studies, from China's Hebei Province, conclude that 81 percent of peasants rely on non-agrarian job holding.\textsuperscript{21} Though no reliable figures exist for Latin America's entirety, approximately 40 percent of Mexicans living in the countryside participate in rural non-farm employment.\textsuperscript{22} In Mozambican only 13 percent of local work was non-agricultural, but this accounted for 35 percent of total wage earnings.\textsuperscript{23}

The last non-migratory income source is urban employment. For Northern countries this the dominant form of off-farm work. In Europe, 80 percent of farms rely on paid labour, most finding employment in cities.\textsuperscript{24} The rural-urban commute is also common for people living on the outskirts of Asia's sprawling metropolises.\textsuperscript{25} The space they occupy can be difficult to call truly rural. Instead, a new form of shifting peri-urban reality is created in the wake of urbanization. This ambiguity also results in urban-rural commutes, with plantations busing day-labour from the slums of South America.\textsuperscript{26}

Migration is the most dramatic route peasants take when seeking additional income. Due to significant variance in the distance traveled and the time spent, cultural impacts from migration are difficult to gauge. That said, a growing body of evidence links circular migration and multi-spacial families to increases in farm productivity. This factors into the continued rise in international migration and remittances- 190 million people in 2005 and US$199 billion in 2006.\textsuperscript{27}

Though figures exist estimating the total migratory population of the world, extrapolating the number who continue to support or participate in subsistence agriculture is difficult. That said, the trend is clear and throughout the third-world peasant migration has been increasing. For many in Latin America, life consists of planting and migrating for work, while a portion of the family stays to tend and harvest.\textsuperscript{28} It is estimated that a full quarter of the active agricultural population on the continent typically reside in cities.\textsuperscript{29} Similar patterns of migration have been observed in Asia and Africa.\textsuperscript{30}

In Sub-Saharan Africa, migration to cities continues despite a decline in urban real incomes.\textsuperscript{c} This can be partially explained by the Todaro model, which suggests that, “it is the potential for higher wages that drives migration not actual wages.”\textsuperscript{31} The uneven realization of these potential incomes invigorates urban-rural linkages. Droughts increase urban remittances, while unemployment is softened with rural support. Income diversification mitigates against disaster, decreasing vulnerability by increasing reliability.\textsuperscript{32}

Across the sub-continent, urban populations are increasingly reliant on food from family members and direct farming. The growth in food flows was noted earlier as an autonomous market

\textsuperscript{c} The rate of rural- urban migration is decreasing, while urban- rural migration and circular migration are on the rise. But this decline is beginning from a very high level. See Owuor (2004)
tactic. What is of special interest here is the continued participation of urban migrants in subsistence farming. A survey in Nakuru town, Kenya, found that half of all urban households access a rural plot and were directly involved in cultivation, while one-third were involved in livestock farming. Some of these families are multi-spatial, with either the wife or husband living in the countryside to focus on farming, while others utilize rented lands near the city. A similar practice was observed by Bryceson among migrant miners, whom regularly maintain small gardens to defend against uneven earnings.

These examples illustrate the complexity of peasant class formations. This is further aggravated by the temporal nature of most migration, which lends a certain degree of indeterminacy to actors' motivations. Despite the transition into and out of the proletarian class, a continuity of peasant identity can be discerned. In Kenya, the majority of urban residents refer to an 'urban house' and a 'rural home', the latter to which they intend to return (56 percent). Chinese migration patterns clearly exhibit the marks of continued peasant identity, as farmers: leave, work, live, and return in tight groups.

While circular migration has been linked to a set of negative social phenomena, i.e. rising STD rates, the experience of migration has positive externalities. In a recent study of China, a strong correlation was found between rural entrepreneurial work and recent return migration. Further, human capital gains were more influential in these occupation changes than monetary gains. This same survey noted a positive effect on women's social power, as measured by greater decision making and reproductive choice. In light of these positive effects, the Chinese government supports circular migration, “as the least expensive and most efficient way of developing rural regions.”

Due to the high cost of migration, poorer peasants migrate shorter distances and for shorter times. This opportunity difference has precipitated increasing inequality in rural landscapes across the world.

The growth of off-farm income has not been linear. Evidence from Africa's southern cone suggests that, given the continued stagnation in cities, migration terms are shortening and urban families are refocusing their energies on cultivation. Nevertheless, sources of additional earnings will remain necessary for most peasants in the coming years.

Regardless of the form alternative income takes, its purpose remains- the replication of rural means of production. Families with off-farm income: purchase more land, sustain higher yields, and breed larger herds. This is of course, to simple. As was shown in China, non-farm income also contributes to the rise of rural industry and the relative decline of agricultural income. Still, the trend prevails, temporary proletarianization enables and strengthens the reproduction of peasant economies.
Collective Action:

The growth of neo-liberalism has gone hand in hand with the proliferation of peasant activism. Since the 1970s, networks of peasant farmers dedicated to developing and disseminating local, sustainable agriculture techniques have sprung up throughout the world. This whole systems approach -known as agro-ecology- has significantly increased yields (by 100 to 400 percent) while decreasing market input dependency. Though this movement is driven by NGO structures, its success is rooted in the peasant desire for a more stable and prosperous resource base.

Campesino a Campesino- in Latin America- and the Participatory Ecological Land Use Management Association (PELUM) -in southern and eastern Africa are two of the most prominent agro-ecology networks in the world; Campesino a Campesino, itself, working with several hundred thousand farmers. The coalition was instrumental in the success of Cuba's state-led re-peasantization program, following the Soviet trade bloc collapse in 1990. PELUM is composed of 210 organizations in 10 countries. Their work has contributed to increased yields for more than half a million farmers.

While these movements have worked with farmers to expanded peasant resilience, they are not themselves peasant movements. The reliance on Northern funding sources makes NGOs reluctant to extend their critique of the neo-liberal food regime beyond farming techniques.

Into this vacuum stepped La Via Campesina (LVC). Founded in 1993, this coalition is composed of 148 organizations from 69 countries. “The very existence of the Via Campesina is to be [the peasant] voice and to speak out for the creation of a more just society.” The organization has been quite successful in this vein; forcing its way into the highest levels of global governance. They claim a broad representative base, stating, “we are the international movement of peasants, small- and medium-sized producers, landless, rural women, indigenous people, rural youth, and agricultural workers.” This class definition is largely in keeping with the one offered here and suggests the development of a consciousness that reflects upon economic realities.

La Via Campesina is composed of a wide array of grassroots organizations, employing multifarious tactics, yet LVC is itself primarily a lobbying tool. It has been lauded as, one of, “the most innovative actors in setting agendas for political and social policies.” The legitimization afforded LVC by the global establishment suggests a level of co-optation. If LVC's 'food sovereignty' agenda was viewed as potentially destabilizing then a much more aggressive response could be expected.

d Though they utilize confrontational means, there goal is agenda transformation.
Peasant organizations continue to proliferate on the local and national level. They act as: financiers, research institutions, policy think-tanks, seed banks, sales co-operatives and direct-action networks; organizations exist to promote all aspects of peasant autonomy. In a significant divergence from earlier nationalist movements, these groups act as a class for itself. Wilder Robles writes of Latin America, “Ironically, these new peasant movements have emerged in established democratic regimes.” This development is not ironic, but predictable given the class stability peasants bring these countries.

**Peasant Demands:**

In peasant struggle, local issues frame local demands. Still, the surfacing class consciousness enables the consolidation of small fights into a global vision. *La Via Campesina* remains the most prominent and elegant advocate:

“No agrarian reform is acceptable that is based only on land distribution. We believe that the new agrarian reform must include a cosmic vision of the territories of communities of peasants, the landless, indigenous peoples, rural workers, fisherfolk, nomadic pastoralists, tribes, afro-descendents, ethnic minorities, and displaced peoples, who base their work on the production of food and who maintain a relationship of respect and harmony with Mother Earth and the oceans.”

Agrarian reform has become a whole systems approach aimed at national food sovereignty. With a rights-based philosophy, food sovereignty, attempts to merge the needs of the urban poor, peasants, and the environment. This marriage will likely prove a lofty goal. Peasant populations and urban slum populations do not have the same class interests. Peasants desire land redistribution, rural infrastructure, and stable, high food prices. While, the urban poor want industrial employment, urban infrastructure, and low living costs (including food). There is significant overlap between the populations due to circular migration. Individuals occupying both economic positions may manage to unite these struggles. Yet there is reason to doubt their success, modes of cultural reproduction (e.g. tribal, extended kin networks, religion, nuclear families) influence the structure and dynamics of movements, complicating communication and unification between the classes. These issues are aggravated by linguistic differences as well as cultural stigmas. In addition, evidence from the Southwest U.S. as well as India, shows the potential for migration to stymy class action.

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e  See Appendix A for a complete table of food sovereignty positions.
By Way of Conclusion

The future is uncertainty. Utilizing philosophy and observation, civilization hopes to gain a recognition of itself. It is science's Sisyphus task to tune prediction and description to a point of certainty. Unfortunately, much of peasant studies has lost its sight. The discipline has 'disappeared' the worlds most predominant group of workers. Many theorists fail to root their observations within systems of global power and produce groundless results. Thinkers coming from a radical economics background, have fared no better. The reliance on predictions from the past over contemporary insight has left many fumbling for validation.

What has been attempted here is a restructuring of peasant theory. Central to this vision is a clear understanding of the peasant class and its position within accumulation. The system of surplus extraction girders all other structures of power within civilization. Though it is an over-extension to assume that an economically equitable world will also be a socially just one; it is not so difficult to envision the most ingrained prejudices fading appreciably with a dramatic shift in economic strength. This is the force class wields when defining social relations.

Sadly, many Marxist have not managed to break with Marx's own expectations, no matter there current applicability. This failing has resulted in deterministic and dualistic readings of class history. Debates focus on original intent and theoretic outcomes, but rarely evolve language in a way that lends clarity to life. This work proposes a reflexive political economy; one which actively shapes and is shaped by the world around it.

The class focus explains the similarities of actions within different regions, but also grants the basis for transnational collective action (as it is manifest in groups, such as, La Via Campesina and Campesino a Campesino). Here the empirical reality validates the approach. Including Northern capitalized family farms in the definition of the peasantry is highly controversial. Yet, their strong involvement in the international peasant struggle suggests that they are correctly placed. As a French peasant leader wrote of food sovereignty, “for the people of the South, [it] means the right to protect themselves against imports. For us, it means fighting against export aid and intensive farming. There is no contradiction there at all.” A class self-consciousness seems to be growing.

This point leads to an interesting theoretic short-fall. La Via Campesina includes the informal 'self-employed' in their movement. This recognition of a common plight does not necessarily mean that the urban 'self-employed' are also peasants, but it does beg the question. The distinction utilized here of
access to land is useful due to lands particular nature with regards to capital, but it may ultimately obscure the larger economic reality. This concern is certainly an issue for further investigation.

Evaluating impediments to direct property control enhanced the utility of the class definition. On the most fundamental basis, it explains why has primitive accumulation not eliminated peasant production. Peasants are the most efficient way to extract surplus from a highly undesirable mode of production. Even in the most complete markets, peasant persistence is facilitated by social and legal structures.

In the third-world the urban informal economy adds further value to the peasantry. A peasant/informal movement is dangerous, while a peasant/government coalition could be a great stabilizing force. On these grounds, mass enclosure is unlikely. Governments have too much to lose and very little gain in an expanded landless class.

Finance capital seems poised to speculate with farm production. Given the power of finance, they will likely get what they want. Still, there is reason to believe that this enclosure process will be short-lived and reversible, seeing as most third-world governments must rely on peasant support to achieve long-term stability.

The limited application of violent tactics and the 'anti-political' stance taken, signal the relative ease with which peasant demands are achieved. This is reflected in legal apparatuses, which facilitate dialogue and resolution, even if they slow the desired speed of transformation. On a world scale, the recognition of peasant value is most clearly seen in the validation of *La Via Campesina* by a large portion of global governance agencies.

The peasantry is not disappearing, while they represent a smaller proportion of the globe, they are still by far the largest class. Their numbers are increasing as is their economic power. Utilizing the techniques of agro-ecology, peasant farming is fully capable of feeding the growing population of the world and absorbing labour supply. The entitlement schemes currently causing chronic hunger may not allow the gains of peasant farming to be realized. This is the realm of struggle. Peasant movements are positioning themselves to bridge the gap between the urban and rural world. If they are successful, then food security may be possible.

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f  Fairs, rodeos, and clubs support peasant culture, often with state funding. Extensive subsidies and insurance are provided to help guarantee reproduction.

g  Relative is important here, this is not meant to imply that demands are easily achieved, but they are now rarely met with extreme repression.
### Appendix A: Dominant Agricultural Model Versus Food Sovereignty Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Dominant Model</th>
<th>Food Sovereignty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>Free trade in everything</td>
<td>Food and agriculture exempt from trade agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production priority</td>
<td>Agroexports</td>
<td>Food for local markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop prices</td>
<td>‘What the market dictates’</td>
<td>Fair prices that cover costs of production and allow farmers and farm workers a life with dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(leave the mechanisms that create both low crop prices and speculative food price hikes intact)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market access</td>
<td>Access to foreign markets</td>
<td>Access to local markets; an end to the displacement of farmers from their own markets by agribusiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>While prohibited in the Third World, many subsidies are allowed in the US and Europe, but are paid only to the largest farmers</td>
<td>Subsidies are ok that do not damage other countries via dumping (i.e. grant subsidies only to family farmers for direct marketing, price/ income support, soil conservation, conversion to sustainable farming, research, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Chiefly a commodity; in practice, this means processed, contaminated food that is full of fat, sugar, high fructose corn syrup and toxic residues</td>
<td>A human right: specifically, should be healthy, nutritious, affordable, culturally appropriate, and locally produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being able to produce</td>
<td>An option for the economically efficient</td>
<td>A right of rural peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunger</td>
<td>Due to low productivity</td>
<td>Problem of access and distribution due to poverty and inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Achieved by importing food</td>
<td>Greatest when food production is in the hands of the hungry, or when produced locally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over productive resources (land, water, forests)</td>
<td>Privatised</td>
<td>Local, community controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to land</td>
<td>Via the market</td>
<td>Via genuine agrarian reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Dominant Model</td>
<td>Food Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>Patentable commodity</td>
<td>Common heritage of humanity, held in trust by rural communities and cultures; ‘no patents on life’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural credit and investment</td>
<td>From private banks and corporations</td>
<td>From the public sector, designed to support family agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumping</td>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>Must be prohibited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly</td>
<td>Not an issue</td>
<td>The root of most problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overproduction</td>
<td>No such thing, by definition</td>
<td>Drives prices down and farmers into poverty; we need supply management policies in US and EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming technology</td>
<td>Industrial, monoculture, Green Revolution, chemical-intensive; uses GMOs</td>
<td>Agroecology, sustainable farming methods, no GMOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>Anachronism; the inefficient will disappear</td>
<td>Guardians of culture and crop germplasm; stewards of productive resources; repositories of knowledge; internal market and building block of broad-based, inclusive economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban consumers</td>
<td>Workers to be paid as little as possible</td>
<td>Need living wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)</td>
<td>The wave of the future</td>
<td>Bad for health and the environment; an unnecessary technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another world (alternatives)</td>
<td>Not possible/not of interest</td>
<td>Possible and amply demonstrated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rosset (2003)
Endnotes

Introduction


Chapter 1

1 Marx pp. 669-670 (1971)
2 Akram-Lodhi, Kay pp. 179 (2010) quote is Kautsky
3 This framework is based on Bernstein, discussed in Akram-Lodhi, Kay; (2010a)
4 See for instance van der Ploeg (2008)
6 Moore pp. 10 (2010)
7 Headley, Bezemer, Hazell pp. 10 (2008)
8 Ibid; Pincus pp. 6 (1996)
9 McMichael pp. 30 (2007)
11 Bush pp. 120 (2010)
12 Araghi pp. 149 (2000)
14 De Schutter pp. 251 (2011)
15 Martinez-Torres, Rosset pp. 162 (2010)
16 Akram-Lodhi, Kay pp. 275 (2010a)
17 Moore pp. 9 (2010)
18 Lewontin pp. 95 (2000)
19 Moore pp. 9 (2010)
20 McMichael (2009)
21 MacFarquhar (2010)
22 Bush pp. 119-120 (2010)
24 Weis pp. 25 (2007) emphasis in original
25 Moyo, Yeros pp. 9 (2005)

Chapter 2

1 See Bonefeld pp. 54 (2008)
2 Van der Ploeg pp. 2 (2008)
3 Wright (2000)
4 Bernstein pp. 54-55 (1994)
5 Ibid. pp. 53
6 Chayanov pp. 263 in Halperin, Dow ed. (1977)
7 Wright pp. 25 (2000)
8 Lehmann pp.140 (1982)

Chapter 3

1 Marx pp. 668-669 (1971)

Chapter 4

1 Kates pp.82 (2000)
2 Davis pp. 2 (2006)
4 Cousins pp. 1 (2007)
5 Araghi pp. 145 (2000)
7 Davis pp. 14 (2006)
8 Van der Ploeg pp. 20 (2010)
10 Weis pp. 23 (2007)
11 Davis pp. 2 (2006)
17 Ibid, pp. 38
18 Ibid.pp. 8, 56 (2007)
19 Potts pp. 817 (2000)
20 Anriquez pp. 8 (2007)
21 Ibid, pp. 4

Chapter 5

1 Wittman pp. 809 (2009)
2 Li pp. 86 (2009)
5 Robles pp. 154 (2001)
6 Potts pp. 824 (2000)
The Guatemalan case offers an exception; suggesting that the combination of high peasant productivity and extra-legal pressure through land seizures may enable effective distribution (Lehmann, 1986; Griffin, pp. 312, 2002).

Chapter 6

1. Lehmann (1986)
2. Van der Ploeg pp. 7 (2010)
3. Ibid
4. See for instance, van der Ploeg (2010); Frayne (2005); van der Ploeg, Jingzhong (2010)
7. Sourced in van der Ploeg pp. 12 (2010), CIDA (1966) capitalization rate being the capital investment per hectare.
18. Van der Ploeg pp. 11 (2010); Donajgrodzki (1989)
19. van der Ploeg pp. 11 (2010)
21. Van der Ploeg, Jingzhong pp. 519 (2010) No distinction is made between non-farm employment requiring migration and jobs not, this is unfortunate considering the strong cultural effects associated with the phenomenon.
By Way of Conclusion

1 Bové pp. 96 (2001)

Appendix A

1 Martinez-Torres, Rosset pp. 169-170 (2010)
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