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Track 3. Strategic Corporate Research and Campaigns
Paper Proposal:

For a (Re-)Politisation of Strategic Corporate Research
Using Social Movement Theory to improve Strategic Research and Campaign planning
Ein Versuch - A Try

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1. Introduction

The notions of 'organizing' in conjunction with 'strategic campaigns' and 'strategic research' has been the shooting star in the international critical union research for twenty years. In the German context it developed (after being ignored for two decades) in some, usually more leftist union circles, as the 'deus-ex-machina' (saviour) in the debate about union decline and union renewal: Even though – or because – there was no unity about what 'organizing' is. A lot of people considered organizing as 'das ganz Andere' (a completely different approach) to the traditional way of unionism - the magic formula against the decline of union power and ability to act. Nonetheless, despite the sketchy understanding of the notion, all protagonists of organizing were united in three concerns: organizing is conflict oriented, participative and has a plan. This was set against the current practices of social partnership, deputing logic and muddling-through.

This – admittedly Woodcut - description of the reception of anglo-saxon (predominantly US) organizing methods in Germany is yielded for a more sober mediation, both on the original and its reality, by the following authors (Choi 2008a, Schmalstieg 2009, Berger und Meyer 2009, Birke 2010, Corrigan, Luff und McCartin 2013) and, regarding its transferability to Germany, by Greven and Schwetz (2008).

Nevertheless, in this discussion several things have been forgotten: That running a strategic campaign has certain requirements with respect to the union involved as well as to its audience. And that these requirements first have to be created, usually under the condition of declining union power and financial resources. That 'organizing' and 'campaigning' in their emancipatory sense are closely related to union renewal, which is a long, set-back paved and mostly painful process. Failed organizing and leverage campaigns are frequently used as proof against the whole concept of organizing, and justification that nothing has to be changed, that everything is good. Not a few unionist are waiting for such setbacks and some even may work towards them.

All this makes it necessary, especially for unions and union environments at the beginning of a renewal process, for generally weak unions, or in complex international campaigns, to minimise wrong decision making and to maximise the likelihood of success.

This paper will argue that insights and categories drawn from Social Movement Theory (SMT) can help improving strategic corporate campaigning (SCR) and the campaign planning process.

At the beginning of the paper, a brief history of strategic campaign and strategic research is presented because this provides some hints, which have came a little out of focus but are worth to remember. In chapter three I try to raise some questions about the current practice of corporate research and campaigns and where missing links are.

Chapter 4 elaborates the concepts of Social Movement Theory (SMT). In recent decades a lot of research has focused on the success or failure of social movements. This has led to the emergence of a wide range of theoretical strands and categories designed to explain the operation and chances of social movement success. As trade unions can, and should be, considered as living social movements, the insights of SMT can be adapted for analysing trade union campaigns and to improve strategic research.

This section draws on the theoretical approach of McGuire (2013) who applied SMT to analyse global and local trade union struggles against the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In order to make SMT available to the trade union research, she utilises three main categories: Political opportunity structure (POS), Mobilisation and Organisational Capacity (MOC), and Framing; combined with a four-dimensional labour power typology — associative, structural, institutional and discursive power.

I extend the concepts utilised by McGuire, adding some further points from the theory and...
attempting to make some new connections to show how this approach is relevant to strategic corporate research.

In Chapter 5 I make some proposals about how SMT can contribute to the theory of Strategic Corporate Research (SCR), how it can address some problems identified and add new perspectives to the usual research and campaign planning process. Chapter 6 summarises the arguments made.
2. Brief history of Strategic Campaigns

The development of Strategic Corporate Research (SCR) is closely related to Strategic Corporate Campaigns (SCC).

At the beginning of this paper I try to give a brief overview of the historical development of such campaigns, knowing that the US unions will know much more about this development than I do. However, I believe that some of the elements of the origin and development of these campaigns are worth remembering and reassessing in terms of their relevance for the current international political and economic situation.

2.1 Origins of the Strategic Corporate Campaign

Strategic Corporate Campaigns conducted by trade unions to organise workers and to enforce labour improvements are a relatively new phenomenon; but with their roots back into the 1930s. That, which are nowadays called strategic campaigns, have their origins in two main sources:
- community organizing in the tradition of Saul Alinsky
- corporate campaigns of the US political New Left

2.1.1 The New Left

The technique of company-related campaigns was developed in the 1960s in the sphere of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The „founding declaration“ of the SDS, the Port Huron Statement of 1962, drew a dark picture of the situation in the USA: tremendous power in the hands of the few, with the majority stuck, without any real influence, in apathy and resignation. To change this it was stated, that the social rules have to be changed and possibilities created for real democratic participation. Appeals to the morals of corporate and political power would be insufficient.

Instead corporations must be made publicly responsible. The SDS argued that it was not possible for true democracy to exist where a minority utterly controls enormous wealth and power. The influence of corporate elites on foreign policy is neither reliable nor democratic; a way must therefore be found to subordinate private American foreign investment to a democratically-constructed foreign policy. The influence of the same giants on domestic life is intolerable as well; a way must be found to direct our economic resources to genuine human needs, not the private needs of corporations nor the rigged needs of maneuvered citizenry.

We can no longer rely on competition of the many to insure that business enterprise is responsive to social needs. The many have become the few. Nor can we trust the corporate bureaucracy to be socially responsible or to develop a "corporate conscience" that is democratic.

Corporations must be made publicly responsible. It is not possible to believe that true democracy can exist where a minority utterly controls enormous wealth and power. (…) Nor can we trust the corporate bureaucracy to be socially responsible or to develop a "corporate conscience" that is democratic. (Port Huron Statement 1962)

In addition, the trade unions, which had, under the pressure of the Tarf-Hartly Act of 1947 (for its consequences see Yeselson 2013) and the general anti-communist hysteria of the McCarthy era, dispelled their more radical parts, were criticised.

In some measure labor has succumbed to institutionalization, its social idealism waning under the tendencies of bureaucracy, materialism, business ethics. The successes of the last generation perhaps have braked, rather than accelerated labor's zeal for change. Even the House of Labor has bay windows:
not only is this true of the labor elites, but as well of some of the rank-and-file. Many of the latter are indifferent unionists, uninterested in meetings, alienated from the complexities of the labor-management negotiating apparatus, lulled to comfort by the accessibility of luxury and the opportunity of long-term contracts. "Union democracy" is not simply inhibited by labor leader elitism, but by the unrelated problem of rank-and-file apathy to the tradition of unionism. (Port Huron Statement 1962)

Further central points of critique were the Vietnam war, racial segregation and the US-backyard politics in Latin America. A big portion of the campaign activity of the New Left were linked to these problems.

In the following years a lot of projects emerged in the sphere of the SDS. Out of them so-called corporate campaigns developed, which aimed to confront big business with the consequences of their behaviour and to try make them change their business practice (Manheim 2001).

2.1.2 Saul Alinsky

The second important source of corporate campaigns was Saul Alinsky and his concept of community organizing.

Saul Alinsky, born in 1909, grew up in a shanty town of Chicago but got the chance to study criminology at the University of Chicago. Later he worked as a community organizer, who tried to help the inhabitants of these shanty towns to develop power and a voice through organisation. His intention was not charity, where other people act in the name of the inhabitants, but the building of citizen organisations through which they could articulate themselves. His aim was the building of a „mass organisation for excercising of political and economic pressure“ (Rabe 1999:16). Alinsky became the most important community organiser of the 1930s.

In 1940 Alinsky founded in Chicago the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), which continued to work after Alinsky's death in 1972 until today in the way he intended. The IAF is a faith-based network of civil and clerical organisations, that also has a cooperation partner in Germany (DICO - Deutsches Institut für Community Organizing).

In 1965 a group of faith-based organisaton of Rochester, NY, hired Saul Alinsky's IAF. The aim was, after a wave of racial uprising, to improve the situation of the afro-american population. Initially by creating workplaces. One year later an important corporate campaign started against a big local corporation, Eastman Kodak. The company, which had a long history of resistance against unionisation (Manheim 2001:12), should agree to employ 600 people of local minorities. In the course of the campaign plenty of elements were used which later also were used in other corporate campaigns. Important elements included shareholder resolutions at the company's general meeting.

A lot of the tactical rules applied by Saul Alinsky (which had been codified in 1971 in his book 'Rules for Radicals') were integrated during the 1970s in the strategic repertoire of the campaigner which stood in the tradition of the SDS and the New Left.

2.2 Corporate campaigns come to the labour movement

Up until the 1970s corporate campaigns and community organizing were applied mainly in the area of international solidarity work, the fight against racial segregation and discrimination and the organisation of impoverished and declassified parts of the population. Although all of these categories could be considered original „labour issues“, these campaigns happened almost completely outside the established trade union movement. The vast majority of the then US trade unions stood in more or less distance to the concerns presented by these activists. These concerns extended always beyond the pure wage issue – they were about equality, international solidarity, war and peace, racial segregation.
This picture slowly changed in the 1970s. However, it was a very slow change because the number of corporate campaigns in the framework of 'normal' labour conflicts was small.

Even if corporate campaigns were exceptional until the 1990s, the efforts of campaigners like Michael Locker and Ray Rogers (about both see Manheim 2001) ensured that new approaches entered the unions and prepared the ground for further change. The increasing marginalisation of labour through the anti-union counter reform since the presidency of Ronald Reagan accelerated this. To leave the defensive, more and more unions started to hire activists from the New Left and former community organizers, which included a lot of migrants. Corporate campaigns, now named strategic campaigns, became part of union organising attempts. During the 2000s the concept expanded to Europe, first to Great Britain and later also to the Netherlands and Germany.

In this respect it must be highlighted that neither corporate campaigns nor community organizing, and subsequently also strategic research, had been exercised anywhere in Germany or Europe. Not by unions and also not by the German New Left. This different tradition leads to transfer problems when corporate campaigns and the use of leverage are intended to be implemented in Europe and Germany. Scholars like Frege (Frege 2000 and 2003; Frege and Kelly 2004) suggest that the different types of unionism in the different country contexts mean that US organizing and campaign concepts do not fit in the German union environment. Therefore, German unions are recommended to stay distant to it and better continue with their traditional social partnership orientation. This idea is shared up until now by the majority of union leaders and works councils in Germany.

• The aim of strategic (union) campaigns: Leverage

Generally there exist a big variety of campaign forms and campaign purposes, which additionally have different degrees of complexity and resource requirements. A good overview is provided by Ulrich Wohland (2013:65ff) in his remarks on the plurality of organizing and campaigns.

In the vast majority of union campaigns, especially in the case of organizing in white spots (i.e. in unorganised companies or industries), concession bargaining or plant closures have to be countered, and frequently an extreme power imbalance between the workforce and the company has to be compensated. A power imbalance may be the result of, for instance: a fragmented workforce, a high degree of casualisation, anti-union behaviour of management, contract work and temporary work, easy relocation of the plant, low degree of unionisation, low strike ability. The overall aim of corporate research is to find possibilities to compensate (to lever) this power imbalance. Levers are sought, which increase the power of the labour side and vice versa decrease the predominance of capital.

2.3 The development of strategic research

While the concepts of organizing and, to a less extent, corporate campaigns are widely received in the German academic organizing literature, strategic corporate research is only barely mentioned (for Germany Choi 2008b, Schwetz 2008, 2013); with the result that in Germany frequently SCR is considered as unnecessary for starting a union organising campaign.

The concept of strategic corporate research in its informational foundation has developed in parallel and in close junction to corporate campaigns. Just as the first manuals for corporate campaigns had been relatively simple, so was that also true for the first handbooks for strategic corporate research. However, in the course of the 1970s they became continuously more sophisticated.

The first union based manual on corporate research, the Manual of Corporate Investigation, was
published 1978 by the Food and Allied Service Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. It was aligned to the former NACLA \(^1\) handbook but was much more detailed and offered a broader palette of possible sources to find the desired information (Manheim 2001:162). In the introduction was stated:

"This manual (...) explains how to gather the information necessary to successfully organize and bargain with employers (...) how to frame a complete picture of the company structure, its finances, strengths and weaknesses. (...) Such actions create economic pressure to supplement the traditional strike weapon, or perhaps avoid a strike." (zit. nach Manheim 2001:162)

In fast sequence further manuals for running campaigns strategies and about strategic research were published, from unions but also from independent groups like the Transnational Information Exchange (TIE \(^2\)), which is also active in Germany and initiates contacts between workers along the supply chain.

Corporate campaigns tried in the beginning to evoke a change of corporate behaviour through pressure on shareholder and lenders, but also on customers. Accordingly this also was the emphasis of corporate research. Later campaigns integrated further elements as potentially useful for the building of strength. By this, the analysis and assessment of the net of relations was also extended. The research manuals became more comprehensive; although the focus and the organisational evaluation in different manuals is quite similar. One method, which has become widely accepted, is the scheme of the US union researcher Tom Juravich (see below).

In his analysis Juravich distinguishes between a) the company itself and b) its outer relationships. The latter is subdivided in the categories, Command & Control, Operational und Outside Stakeholders. The Juravich scheme can be found 1:1 in the Strategic Corporate Research Guide of the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) (TUC 2007). Other unions like the IG Metall in Germany have slightly adapted it for their own purposes.

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\(^{1}\) North American Congress on Latin America

\(^{2}\) www.tie-germany.de
3. From research to campaign

When the research is done, the campaign planning starts.

At this point both researcher and campaign planner are faced by a transfer problem: how to design out of the research findings a coherent campaign plan which is likely to have success? Since I am doing strategic research, I also work according to the above Juravich scheme and try to help plan a union campaign, searching for leverage and making proposals about how to use them.

The big questions are: What determines success? What determines whether a lever succeeds or fails? What are the preconditions of success? Finally, what is a success? And could these determinants be researched, mapped and influenced?

These question marks made me look for new theories and tools which could facilitate the transfer problem from corporate research to corporate campaign. Some answers I found in the history of organizing and corporate campaigning, others in the different approaches of the so-called Social Movement Theory (SMT).

- Saul Alinsky: researching one's own community

First, I want to come back to the other origin of corporate campaign and research: the community organizing in the tradition of Saul Alinsky.

The main difference between his approach and that of the New Left can be seen in the more prominent role of the own community as an actor. Alinsky’s approach has intersections with SMT and provides additional openings for the integration of SMT in the theory of strategic research.

Saul Alinsky thought in categories of power, not in those of politics (in its meaning of election, lobbying etc.). He was convinced that the power does not give anything voluntarily. People have to fight for it. This meant at the same time a rejection of any representative or deputing approach, where deputies act in the name of the affected people. This was translated in the IAF’s iron rule: "Never do for others what they can do for themselves." (Waldrefff 2002: 17).

At the base of his activities was a power structure analysis, an analysis of the given power structures of the community, a corporation or organisation. The aim was to research where the sources of power of the opponent are situated, who is responsible for the grievance and who has
the power to solve the problem. This research not only covered the formal, that means official, aspects but also informal power relationships (Staples 2004).

In addition to formal, easily discerned lines of command or control, the researcher also must factor in informal power relationships. Your organizing target may have a formal, legal responsibility to report to the next person within an agency or company, but may be far more under the sway of a powerful politician or business person whose name will never appear in the official table of organization. (Staples 2004)

The power structure analysis of Saul Alinsky also included the own community. A realistic assessment of the own strength was considered as essential for success. The German title of a selection of his texts "Anleitung zum Mächtigsein" (guidance for being powerful) expresses what the aim was: enabling people to act on their own behalf and building strong citizen organisations through an honest analysis of the power structure and potentials of the own community; a citizen organisation which is able to challenge the power structure of the opponent successfully. This can be easily transferred to union organizing.

- Missing pieces

However, these ideas have come a little out of focus in current corporate research. Often the clever application of various forms of campaign elements stands in the foreground, without a) having sufficiently researched the power resources available to labour (union and workers), and b) without a realistic analysis of the preconditions for successfully running a strategic campaign or a single element in it (resources, willingness, capability). That means that the own organisation and the stand of its capabilities is frequently not investigated in a way that is necessary. In practice this can lead to the situation, that the own mobilising capability and resources available are over- or underestimated; that new challenges can not be reacted on due to lack of (power) resources or that possibilities are not taken up although they could have been.

- Possible explanation: Depoliticisation of strategic research

One possible answer is, that in the course of the development of SCR the two main actors of union organizing campaigns came a little out of focus: the workers and the union itself. The application of sophisticated methods of corporate research had, in my observation, the somehow irritating effect that the campaign planner knows everything about the corporation but only little about the workers and the union itself. Even successful leverage seeking and identifcation of activists at the workplace does not necessarily provide an insight into: a) class formation and consciousness of the workforce, and how worker's living and work experience are individually processed, b) the capability and readiness of the union as an organisation to run an organizing campaign successfully, and c) the wider socio-economic and political environment which may restrict or facilitate specific campaign goals and arguments, campaign elements and activities.

The result of this strong focus on the corporation and its relations to the enviroment is a kind of depoliticisation of strategic corporate research. The lack of knowledge about the actors, workers and their union, can lead to a harmful misinterpretation of the situation, a danger which increases with the size and complexity of a campaign. This is respectively true in international campaigns conducted by Global Unions which are confronted by a big varity of „union worlds“; and it is particularly true in trade union environments like Germany where a short cut understanding of strategic research (and campaign) is prevailing: the idea that finding and using some form of leverage will lead to the easy defeat of the oppositional party.

A second explanation of why workers and unions as subjects are frequently neglected in current SCR is, that the union may, in conclusion, consider leverage seeking an easier alternative to changing itself as an organisation or being confronted with the real consciousness and intentions of workers. Organizing and corporate campaigns are closely related to union change in both
dimensions: regarding organisational capabilities and orientation, and in respect to goals and union democracy. If both are not done or not wanted, than it seems to be easier to search for leverage, hoping that it works, although the preconditions for success do not exist.

And finally, another explanation could be the lack of an interpretational framework to analyse and map the wider context of a planned campaign, its implications and preconditions in respect to the dimensions employer and labour, workers and the wider public.

According to the previous findings it can be stated that campaign strategies are frequently undertaken without:

a) sufficiently understanding the wider social and political context in which action takes place;
b) adequately studying the power potential of the oppositional and internal forces and power dynamics;
c) without a realistic assessment of the requirements of an extended strategic campaign, or the individual elements;
d) without an understanding of the basis for building support for action; and
e) how all these elements are interrelated and are influencing each other

To minimise this danger, this paper suggests that researchers need to pay more attention to the systematic assessment of the work and community environments beyond their relation to the company. And they must also take a harder look at the capacity of their own organisation.
4. Social Movement Theory as an analytical framework for union campaigns

In recent decades a lot of research has focused on the success or failure of social movements. This has led to the emergence of a wide range of theoretical strands and categories designed to explain the operation and chances of social movement success. As trade unions can, and should be, considered as living social movements, the insights of SMT can be adapted for analysing trade union campaigns.

The following sections draw mainly on the theoretical approach of McGuire (2013) who applied SMT to analyse global and local trade union struggles against the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In order to make SMT available to trade union research, McGuire develops a framework which utilises three main categories: Political opportunity structure (POS), Mobilisation and Organisational Capacity (MOC), and Framing; combined with a four-dimensional labour power typology — associative, structural, institutional and discursive power – drawn from studies about the sources of union power.

McGuire (2014) argues that these theoretical categories provide a basis for analysing the sources of power that unions are able to draw on to exert influence and for understanding how these sources of power are enhanced or weakened by the external context and unions’ own internal capacity (or lack thereof).

According to this framework, the capacity for a movement to mobilise in relation to an issue of concern will depend on the existence of a number of interrelated factors. First, opportunities must be recognised and strategically framed in a way that encourages wide-spread contestation and solidarity. In addition, oppositional movements must prioritise the issue, and have sufficient power and mobilisation and organisational capacity to take advantage of opportunities where they are identified.

Below I elaborate on the concepts utilised by McGuire, add some further points from the theory and attempt to make some new connections to show how this approach is relevant to strategic corporate research.

4.1 POS, MOS, Framing – and POWER

4.1.1 Sources of union power

The power resources approach asks about the sources of power of trade unions. This approach which originates in the work of Eric Olin Wright (2000) and Beverly Silver (2003), and for Germany is represented and further developed by Dörre (2008), distinguishes three main sources of power: structural power, associative or collective power, and institutional power (well and briefly summarized in Haug 2009:885f).

- Structural Power

Structural power arises from from the structural or technical power of workers or a group of workers in the economic system or within a company from where a specific ability ensues to intervene in the economic process. Silver (2003) distinguishes it further into ‘market bargaining’ power and ‘workplace bargaining’ power. Market bargaining power derives from restricted labour markets like scarcity of workers supply or of specific skills which both lead to good exit options. Workplace bargaining power, on the other hand, draws its strength from the strategic location of workers within the production system. Structural power is frequently exercised spontaneously in
form of 'labour unrest', situative indignition, plant occupation, acts of sabotage, work-to-rule or absentism.

➢ **Associational Power**

Associational power, often also named collective power or organisational power, develops out of the solidaric self-organising of single persons or groups, which are too weak by themselves, into associations that can exercise more power through collective action and mutual support. The lack of structural power partly can be compensated by associational power without being able to replace it fully.

The intention of neo-liberal policy, as well as restructuring of companies, is to weaken both associational and structural power of workers and unions successfully. The means for it are well known: Demolishing of social state, labour laws, de-regulation of restriction of capital's freedom to do what ever they want, encouraging of sub-contraction, outsourcing, privatisation and increasing of competition and so on.

➢ **Institutional Power**

Institutional Power refers to the codified rights of unions within the system of industrial relations and in the state through which power can be exercised. Usually they are institutionalised results of former class struggles and class compromises, i.e. results of former associative power. The degree of institutional power available to unions differs strongly between countries, ranging from zero to relevant - the latter existing mainly in the so called 'developed world'. There they have materialised in labour law, tri-partite institutions and co-determinations rights. Where they exist they are tied to the national state, any transfer of national power to supra-national entities tend to reduce unions' institutional embeddedness and power.

This category is usually neglected in SMT, what is not suprising as social movements are routinely and per definition not institutionalised. They may become so in the future, but in actual struggles they are not. However, the dimension of institutional power is widely discussed in industrial relations literature, and for Germany this dimension is dominating in the discussion of German unionism.

Dörre, (2008, 2009) makes two important points in respect to the question of to what extent institutional power is helpful for unions:

a) Institutional power embedds a union in state and society, it pre-forms the procedures and strategies of collective actors, be they works councils, unions or employer associations. By it they enable to exercise power by providing access and rooms for negotiations but they also restrict the means of action available to them. In this sense institutional power restricts the exercise of associative power.

b) Those arrangements are likely to stay in order even if social power relations have changed substantially. Institutional power is also exercised by unions in phases when the weakening of the organisation is loomed.

Utilising institutional power requires that the trade unions are still accepted as the authentic representatives of wage earners in society, despite a decline in their cohesiveness. The prospect of extending institutional power beyond its generating conditions leads some trade unions to compensate for deficits in representation by compliant behaviour towards the institutions. By doing so, however, the wage earners’ organisations permanently run the risk of conserving action strategies which have gradually become inadequate for the current conditions. (Dörre et.al. 2009: )

The crucial point is: If the difference between exercised institution power and the 'real'
associative power becomes too big, it is likely that capital and state will come to the conclusion that lack of real representativeness of workers does not justify the „granted rights“. That means, a union movement lacking associative power will sooner or later also lose their institutional power. Or, maybe even worse, if this does not happen: the union as an organisation maintains but does not achieve anything for workers and more and more overtakes eine „Ordnungsfunktion“ (order function), i.e. to prevent labour unrest and to back the neo-liberal economic regime (Deppe 2007). Hans-Jürgen Urban (2010), member of the board IGM, and Deppe speak in this respect about „geliehener Macht“ (borrowed power), it could also be named „verliehene Macht“ (granted rights)

However, such institutional rights also could be used for strengthening structural and associative power, to support workers in union campaigns. They could be politicised and integrated in corporate campaigns if, for example, people sitting in such institutions take up the demands of workers, and help them exercise power. This is the opposite to the traditional deputy (representative) logic in which unions or their officials are solving the problem, instead here institutional power is used as a lever. However, the precondition for it is that people sitting in these institution are willing to act. To politicise these institutions and to bring the right people in, is a task in the process of union renewal. And the task of strategic research is to investigate the possibilities of to what extent such institutional rights can be used in a conducted campaign.

➢ Discursive Power

Power not only exists in the material sense of the formal disposal over people and capital but also through the successful setting of topics and the ability to govern the interpretation of events. The marching-through of neo-liberal thinking is not at least based on this. The capability to provide a common interpretation of events, a common narrative which is convincing for the wider public so that it can become hegemonial, is a essential pre-condition that a campaign lights-up (‘zündet’) and helps to balance power unevenness. This capability is described as discursive power. Successful framing is the key process through which discursive power is exercised. Therefore it constitutes a vital dimension of union power.

In the literature of political science discursive power is quoted as a forth source of power from which social movements and unions can source power (deputing for others Lukes (2005) and Levasque und Murray (2010)). In the German discussion Haug (2009) considers cultural hegemony as the forth source of power trade unions require.

In her research on trade union campaigns against the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), McGuire (2013) comes to the result, that the successful exercise of discursive power had been one pre-condition that the negotiations in important areas could be influenced. Moreover, this had a positive impact on the mobilisation capability.

However, trade unions and social movements are far away from being hegemonial. The hegemonial discourse is against union, workers and citizens, based on the TINA principle (Their is no alternative). Thus, unions are not in the situation that they easily could govern the direction of public discourses. With respect to the GATS negotiations she writes:

Dominant discourses such as globalisation and free trade can constrain union action by excluding them from the discourse, by promoting the belief that there is no alternative to the current system and thus disempowering people, or by delegitimising alternative ideas and making them difficult to even talk about (for example, by dismissing them as ‘protectionist’ (McGuire 2013: 35)

This also applies to all other topics trade unions and workers routinely are speaking about. The hegemonial public discourse is part of the given Political Opportunity Structure (see below) and they affect heavily workers consciousness and by it the mobilisation capability of a movement. So, they have to be taken into consideration if a campaign message should resonate with the workers and the public.
However, McGuire considers discursive power more as an „enabling or disabling“ power rather then a power in itself:

"Perhaps it is best to see discursive power as an ‘enabling’ or ‘disabling’ power, rather than as a direct power. As an ‘enabling’ power it is essential for building support behind a position, for mobilising collective action, and for contesting dominant ideas and practices. Framing is one of the key ways in which discursive power is exercised. The discursive capacities and framing capabilities of unions are therefore important." (McGuire 2013: 36)

Similarly argues Haut (2009: 888) when he describes hegemony as something that constitutes leadership ability without actually being leadership by itself.

4.1.2 POS, MOC and Framing

The four power dimensions are more of a quantitative then qualitative nature, they reveal only little about the real capabilities and strengths of the own organisation. Also they reveal little about the specific framework which supports or restricts the prospects for success of union's activities.

For both, approaches from the theory of Social Movements can be made applicable. McGuire (2013) has combined the relevant aspects of these theories with the power resources approach and reviewed to what extent they are useful to explain the prospect of success of union campaigns.

➢ Political Opportunity Structure (POS)

The concept of Political Opportunity Structure (POS), first proposed by McAdam (1982), refers in fact to the political disposition of state and society; concrete to its democratic content, its openness to demands from outside, be they citizen, social forces or organised interest groups. In this meaning, the usual German connotation of 'opportunity' which is more in the sense of 'chance' is misleading. The 'chances' also can tend to be zero; or better said, they can be good for the ones, and bad for others.

To these more general, one could say the given, political opportunities come those of a situative kind, opportunities which only exist for a moment or only exists because specific circumstances have developed - quasi 'windows of opportunity'. Both, given and situative opportunities - but also union's ability to recognise and use them - decide not to an unessential degree about the success of a campaign.

The concept of POS has been criticized from opposite directions: to be too restricted and to be too open. McGuire summarized the critique in academic literature and proposed as a solution to define POS always in close reference on the type of investigated issue:

"...The concept of political opportunity structure has been criticized for a number of reasons: for not being clearly enough defined; for focusing too heavily on the political realm and political power while ignoring social and cultural factors; for treating opportunities as stable rather than subject to rapid change; and, for treating opportunities as “objectively existent” rather than socially constructed, in terms of their perception and strategic intervention by movement actors (see Rucht 1996: 189). (...)"

As Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) note, “the concept of political opportunity structure is [...] in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually ever aspect of the social movement environment”. I have tried to address this tendency towards overgeneralisation by defining POS more tightly in relation to the particular issue field and movement organisation being investigated; (McGuire 2013: 184)

It seems to be obvious that in union struggles (i.e. class struggles) issues like class formation, class consciousness, class and union history are essential and absolutely cannot be ignored. It also cannot be ignored if a country faces a deep economic crisis, religious tensions, criminal violence...
and the like. In particular, in international union campaigns, the POS concept provides good hints about what has to be taken into consideration because the different POS in different countries determine what kind of activities are available, what can be done in all countries, and what only in some (see below). However, it always must be discussed what factors should be considered as part of POS -- it seems to appropriate to define it rather narrowly as too wide.

An analysis and mapping of the given and situative POS a social movement, or a trade union, is operating in, draws attention to the contextual factors “which facilitate or limit the building of a specific movement structure, resource collection, and the eventual carrying out of protest activities” (Rucht 1996: 188). The most obvious factor for POS is the willingness of the state to ignore or suppress protests of citizen, social movements or unions – or even fight their sheer existence, on the one hand. Or the invitation and inclusion of them in the process of consensual decision making on the other. Generally speaking POS is about the access of social forces to the political process and the existence of a real say in it.

In the words of Donna McGuire (2003):

> The responsiveness of a political system depends among other factors on the formal and informal channels available for social actors to access policy processes and put their concerns on the agenda, on the leading party in government, on the degree of policy consensus among policy makers, on the government’s perception of its vulnerability to social protest, on the opinion of the attentive public, etc.

(McGuire 2003)

This also applies to trade unions. In their case the POS is closely related to union’s institutional power although not congruent. Institutional power in the close sense means union’s legal embeddedness in the political system, by law, i.e. codifyed union and co-determination rights, right to strike and for collective bargaining, seats in self-governing or tri-partite bodies etc., and by invitation and practice, i.e. mainly regular consultations in various issues. In the wider sense it the quality of access to and influence on decision makers, the existance of allies in the political institutions.

However, institutional power, the existence of codetermination rights, a strong embeddedness in the policital system, does not mean necescessarily that the POS for unions is favorable: you can have access and a seat in a labour party but the party does not help in any way, you can give statements in legislative processes but you are routinely ignored, you can have the right for collective bargaining but the employer does not speak with you, you can have co-determination rights but the employer crushes the works council and the state prosecutor looks away. So, your institutional power can be very good on paper but very small in reality.

Usually in SMT literature situational opportunities resp. 'windows of opportunity' were linked to changes in the policy process, that means elections, changes in government, political troubles, legislative initiatives and so on. McCarthy et al. (1996: 299) argue that electoral cycles can provide “windows of opportunity to bring issues to public attention and to the attention of elites”. This is at least theoretically true but given the overall tendency to post-democracy, it is the question to what extent this is still real. Additionally, the categories used seems to be too small as situative opportunities can also be caused by economic changes (economic slow down, scarcity of skilled workers), cultural changes (scandals and upraising political debates). Further, situative opportunities cannot only be situative in time, they can also be situative in space. For instance, a union’s access to a specific institution is generally bad in the whole country but good in a specific region or only on a single specific topic; then this could also be described as a situational opportunity – because it only exists in the specific region or only on this single topic – and may only exist only because a specific regional organisation was clear sighted enough to have brought supportive people in the right position.

Issues like the socio-economic situation of a region, the history of class stuggles, the current composition of classes, and the prospects of a region also restrict or widen the range of potential...
campaign activities, it determines what people believe and hope and what kind of activities resonate in the given environment. It makes a difference to act in a region with a long and painful history of lost class struggles and deindustrialisation (e.g. former mining or ship-building regions) or in an economically prosperous region with low unemployment but high migration pressure, lack of payable housing, gentrification problems etc.

Especially in international campaigns further considerations come into the picture, e.g. issues like religious beliefs and divisons, minority issues, specific class divisions and the like. They all determine what a union can successfully do in a specific campaign in a specific region. Therefore they all form the POS of a given union campaign.

On the other hand the POS is not static. Successful mobilisation of members and citizens and a discursive hegemony can improve the receptiveness of state (and private) institutions. And this is a product of own activity. And not least they are also product of own former activity or inactivity.

It is important to note that the POS is context specific with the result that each campaign has its own POS. it will vary depending on the issue, the political field, the country context, degree of internationalisation and the targeted institution or organisation.

To map the Political Opportunity Structure and identify opportunities for intervention we can look at the structures of the political system and the formal and informal mechanisms for inclusion and participation that exist.

In summary, important determinants of POS appear to be:

- Who controls the policy process? (i.e. decision-makers)
- The formal and informal mechanisms and procedures for labour and/or civil society inclusion and participation that exist;
- The alignment of political forces (class interests, political groups, interest groups)
- Availability of ‘elite’ allies
- Policy legacy, receptivity and consensus within relevant ministries and government departments;
- The formal and informal avenues of access for civil society to decision-makers
- Willingness of state to repress protest Vs its vulnerability to demands
- Socio-economic situation (class and general history, unemployment, regional prospects)
- Situational opportunities: Elections, international meetings, or major policy events that may provide ‘windows of opportunity’. Current public debates, economic slowdown
To give an example from Germany

You found out that health & safety issues are the most important for workers and you decide to design your campaign around these issues. Part of the campaign is to involve health insurances and occupational insurance in the struggle. Both have self-governing bodies in which union representatives are sitting.

If health and occupational insurances would be open to complaints and protest, demands of workers to intervene with investigations, imposts on the employer etc., these institutions could amplify the effectiveness of a campaign strategy around health & safety issues. Even if the self-governing bodies don't have real influence, they at least could demand and press the institutions to do their job and also could be active by themselves and become part of the union campaign. With positive impacts on MOC and framing possibilities.

Thus, the task is: to make them taking action in the desired way. Part of the research would be:

- What could both do theoretically which may be helpful to put pressure on the employer? What would be possible in an interaction between a supportive institution and workers/union in the given campaign?
- How receptive are these institution to demands from unions and worker? What is their 'normal behaviour in such cases?
- What could the self-governing bodies do to make the institutions act if they are not willing by themselves? Do we have people in these bodies who would be supportive?
- If these institutions are not supportive today, what could be done that they become more supportive in the future? At least to have better people in the self-governing bodies in which the union movement as a whole is sending people in regular elections.

A successful attempt to change the general attitude of such institutions and have better people in the self-governing bodies would have positive effects in several fields: The POS in the field of health & safety issues had improved which provides better opportunities to campaign around it. This improves at the same time the framing opportunities and by it MOC (in the sense that a union successfully organise openings for leverage, which is likely to improve the mobilisation of workers). And: it is a step forward in the union renewable process.

Of course, better influence can be used in the old deputing logic of solving the problems for others without any participation of workers. However, this would not help really because nor associational nor discoursive power would increase.

➢ Mobilisation and Organisational Capacity (MOC)

With MOC is described the ability and willingness of an organisation to provide and mobilise the needed resources for collective actions. Resources can be material factors like staff, facilities, money and means of communication and immaterial factors such as skills and expertise, access to media and politics. McGuire (2013:21f) created this term with recourse to the more vague resource mobilisation theory (see McAdam, 1996; Rucht 1996; Cress and Snow 1996) which is focusing mainly on structural factors. To it she added additionally, crucial elements for union mobilising, in particular the important role of collective identity formation which is neglected in the resource mobilisation theory.

That means, a social movement or union needs both: sufficient resources and effective mobilisation structures and organisational capacity (McAdam et al. 1996, Rucht 1996). Only then
a movement is able to take advantage of political opportunities.

Hyman (2007: 198) defines organisational capacity as the ability: “to assess opportunities for intervention; to anticipate, rather than merely react to, changing circumstances; to frame coherent policies; and to implement these effectively.”

However, having resources is not sufficient, it needs also the capability of using them. Whether a union or movement is capable for it, depends on a lot of factors. Therefore mobilisation capacity goes far beyond membership numbers or union density. Although union density is usually taken as a measure for union strength it doesn’t say much about the capacity and willingness of unions to mobilise members for collective actions. This is more dependent on internal structures, integration in civil society networks and not at least the political orientation of a trade union.

An important factor beyond having resources is the existence of 'strategic capabilities', as Levesque and Murray (2010) suggest. They identified four needed strategic capabilities: „intermediating between contending interests to foster collaborative action and to activate networks; framing; articulating actions over time and space; and learning.” (Levesque and Murray 2010:333).

McGuire (2013: 21f) gives a summary:

In general, a movement must have sufficient “people, money, knowledge, frames, skills, and technical tools to process and distribute information and to influence people”, and adequate mobilisation or collective structures through which these resources can be organised and mobilised, and through which people can engage in collective action (Rucht 1996: 186). For union movements, its mobilisation capacity includes its formal union structure and collective networks at both the national and international levels. It can also include its links with associated community and civil society networks. A union movement’s resource capacity can also be bolstered by access to external resources through association with labour-friendly research institutes or the integration of ‘lay’ specialists. (McGuire 2003:21f)

- Union democracy and political orientation

MOC is strongly linked to union democracy and the political orientation of the union.

Research by Peetz (1998: 194) has shown the close relationship between the quality of contact to and participation of members and worker’s willingness to take action and to remain a union member. A functioning delegate structure is essential for this, which is, by the way, also essential for distributing union’s message and the narrative in a conducted corporate campaign.

Fairbrother (2003: 26) (überprüfen ob mit Yates) makes a similar point by stating that in most countries unions have focused more intensively on organizing the unorganized rather than to rethink the way the existing members are integrated in the union, how democratic and participative the union structure is, and how active the members are at the single workplace.

Another important factor is the political and economic orientation of a union or union branch in combination with the stand of union democracy. This widely neglected factor determines to a big degree the union’s mobilisation capability and willingness.

Carter and Poynter (1999: 511) draw attention to the potential conflict between organizing and the political orientation of a union: In respect of the introduction of „organizing“ in two British unions they state that the close relationship of MSF and Unison to New Labour would make both compatible only if organizing “has no radicalising effect on its membership and is stripped of class politics”. The same is true in cases of accommodated social partnership and co-management unionism.

Such orientations usually correlate with an informal “membership hierarchy” which results in the relative privileging of the interests of the dominant groups within the union and the marginalisation of minorities. The main clientele usually set the tone within unions over decades and tend to
generalize their own partial interests as the general interests of all wage-workers, ignoring the interest of underrepresented worker groups like women, un-/semiskilled workers, agency and freelance worker, unemployed and migrants (Frerichs and Pohl 2004:51f).

In summary, important determinants for MOC appear to be:

a) The unity and coherence of the union movement, as this affects its collective strength and capacity to mobilise members behind a common position (Hyman 2007, Robinson 1994);

b) The effectiveness and inclusiveness of a union movement’s mobilisation and organisational structures. This includes its affiliate and delegate structures, union networks, and external alliances and coalitions, and its capability for strategic planning and organisation and mobilisation of resources to achieve desired outcomes.

c) Sufficient specialist knowledge and expertise, as these capabilities are necessary for understanding the impact of issues on members and where to intervene in the policy process, and for framing and legitimising claims (Hyman 2007, McGuire and Scherrer et al. 2010).

d) The existence of strategic capabilities to make a realistic plan, to act professionally according to it but being flexible enough to react on new developments.

e) A general political and socio-economic orientation of the organisation and its leadership which does not stand against the campaign goal (Carter and Poynter 1999; Frerichs and Pohl 2004).

- Bringing the union back in

By asking about union’s reality regarding MOC, the union itself as one of the subjects within a corporate campaign is put back into the analytical framework.

Assessment of the MOC can provide a level of self-analysis currently missing from strategic organizing and campaigning. It can help unions assess the level of resources needed and available for a particular campaign, including:

- Whether it has enough time, money and staff (with sufficient knowledge and expertise) to dedicate to the campaign.

- The state of its mobilising structures – membership networks (including international networks), external networks, informal channels, potential allies.

- The existence of informal networks – between union members (rank & file contacts, cross-border affiliations), between union members and local community (church, social groups, clubs etc).

- Whether it has connections with international NGO networks – advocacy groups (Transnational Advocacy Networks - TANS), related causes, those with a monitoring role.

Note: Such networks can bring additional economic, cultural and mobilising resources, and additional Repertoires of Contention – i.e. technical assistance and information, letters of support, international delegations, pressure on corporate boards, information campaigns aimed at customers or consumers (Frundt 2005: 30). Access to international networks can also help overcome local blockages.

- Organisational and institutional factors within the union and overall level of organisational readiness and strategic capabilities (willingness of leadership to take action – capacity for strategic decision-making and strategic framing etc.).

Of course one should also look at the MOC of the opposition including its resources and networks e.g. corporate networks, lobby groups.
Framing Capabilities

A successful mobilisation not only requires opportunity and capacity but also a consensus of common beliefs about the general or specific issue, i.e. shared moral orientations, problem description and solutions, and not at last a shared willingness to take action. Where such consensus does not exist, which should be commonly the case, it must be created at first. Sometimes this succeeds only in the process of collective action. Benford and Snow (2000:14) name this 'collective actions frames' and define it as an “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organisation“

Without such a set of convictions, without a common narrative about that what is and what should be, what is right and wrong, collective action only rarely succeed. Specific problems must be framed in a way that it is not only shared from the own membership but also from allies and the general public. Frequently movements dock on interpretative ideas, discourses and narratives from the existing “cultural stock“ as Rucht (1996) calls it.

Frames depend on the audience and the wider political and socio-cultural context, by this they have a strong link to POS, and are not static in time. As the oppositional forces also frame their own interests, the frames of a social movement are subject of contestation and redefinition (including their reception in media which may have their own interpretation of the narrative). Therefore a movement’s narrative will change over the course of a campaign in a constant process of framing, re-framing and re-re-framing.

"The nature of the political opportunity structure can constrain some collective action frames while facilitating others. Changes in political systems or material conditions can lead to changes in frame resonance, which in turn may make it necessary or advantageous to re-frame particular issues and claims." (McGuire 2013: 26f).

The framing tasks and processes cannot, and do not have to be for our purpose, elaborated in full detail in this text but its main categories and determinants for success should be presented here as they have a strong connection to SCR.

With reference on Benford and Snow (2000) three main tasks of framing can be distinguished:

- to build a common understanding of the problem and who or what is to blame and develop a sense of grievance or injustice that inspires people to become engaged (Diagnostic Frames);
- to proposes convincing solutions that build broad social consensus, and identifies a target that can potentially ‘solve’ the problem (Prognostic Frames); and,
- to provide reasons to take action and hope that the actions of participants can help redress the problem (Mobilising Frames).

These are elaborated in more detail in the table below.

Table: Types and Purposes of Frames Needed for Collective Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Questions addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic</td>
<td>Build consensus assign blame build anger</td>
<td>What is the problem and why is it a problem? (simplify) Why is it a problem? (injustice/threat) Why is it important to me? (relevance) Who or what is to blame? (target/addresssee for blame)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prognostic</td>
<td>Build consensus identify</td>
<td>How should the problem be solved? (goal/solution)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relationship between MOC and Framing

Framing issues have strong connections to MOC because they form an essential constituent of union's ability to mobilise members and the wider public. Therefore it makes a difference how inclusive or exclusive the framing is. In general applies, the broader the frame and the wider the range of social groups that can be addressed, the greater the potential mobilisation. On the other hand the frame must not be too broad and too general because then the narrative easily can lose its inspiring appeal and becomes vague – something you can find in all party programs from left to right in more or less the same wording.

Bringing the workers back in

While MOC has the focus more on the union as an actor, the framing capability and process brings the workers as the other subject back in the analytical framework. Like MOC also Framing has strong links to the issue of union democracy. During the framing process it is proved whether a union has real access to workers. At this point it is proved how much a union knows about workers beyond the union's core clientele, i.e. how migrants think, what precarious workers feel and hope, how the real life is in economically devastated regions and how the collective memory of workers is impacted by a history of lost union struggles. What unions know about class and solidarity structures, in particular of migrant workers and their communities. Migrant workers are usually at the vast bottom of the economic hierarchy, often exploited contract workers, brought in by more or less criminal labour broker (this term from South Africa names at best what these agencies are), often undocumented. Mobilising worker, 'reaching' them under these conditions is only possible when a union knows something about it (see POS), has the same goals and speaks the same language.

Use of social emperical research

In order to improve the framing process and by it the mobilisation of workers, the application of social emperical research would be necessary, in particular those of a qualitative nature which are able to explore not only the union leaders' interpretation of the problem and possible solutions but also:

a) the workers' interpretation of the problem and whom to blame (diagnostic frames),
b) the workers' interpretation of a solution and who could provide it (prognostic frames) and
c) what narrative / frames would make workers willing to take collective action (mobilising frames)

Summarized, the main tasks of framing are to:

a) Identify an issue as a problem and assign blame (diagnostic frames);
b) Suggest solutions and strategies to deal with the problem (prognostic frames); and,
c) Provide a rationale for taking action (mobilising frames) (Bedford and Snow 2000: 614).
5. What can SMT add to the theory of SCR?

I argue that SMT can address many of the problems presented above by adding new perspectives to the usual SCR and campaign planning procedure.

A little simplified it could be claimed that:

- SCR asks for leverage and sheds light on the corporation
- SMT asks for the conditions of success and sheds light on the context, unions and workers

The application of SMT broadens the perspective of SCR.

First, it expands the object perspective by asking about the wider political context in which a campaign takes place, and second, more importantly, SMT brings the subjects of the union organizing process back into the analytical framework as it was intended by Saul Alinsky: the workers and their union.

From the theory and the examples provided it should be obvious that there are strong connections not only between the SMT categories POS, MOC and Framing and the four dimensions of union power but also among the SMT categories themselves:

- POS, MOC and Framing capabilities influence each other. If you improve one, it is likely that also the others are positively affected – and vice versa
- improved POS, MOC and Framing capabilities improve also the four power categories
- the four power resources have impacts on each other, e.g. improved discursive power is likely to improve also associational power. On the other hand, reduced associational power could eventually weaken institutional power.
- the power resources can be used to improve POS, MOC and Framing capabilities e.g. if you improve institutional power this could improve your POS (see example presented above).

• SMT and Union Renewal

As demonstrated, the application of SMT could be described as a 'self-survey tool' of the state of a union's capabilities to successfully run a strategic campaign and/or organise in new fields. However, it is not only that, the application of this SMT framework describes in particular the degree of vitality and strength of a union - which at the same time is an assessment of the stand of union renewal.

Thus, SMT asks, what kind of union do we have and for whom? And, what kind of union do we need and want to have?

Of course, good SCR and campaign planning should cover most of the issues presented. But in practise, particularly in union enviroments like Germany, the research focus is very unevenly distributed: a lot on the corporation, its net of relations and regulatory and economical environment; little on worker's (class consciousness and history); very little on the union itself (ressources and orientation, internal power dynamics).

If a SCR would start not at the company but from MOC, union and workers would stay more in the centre of attention.

Additionally, applying SMT can prevent unions from the danger to utilise SCC/SCR, and the whole
concept of organizing, only as a *Sozialtechnik* (like social engineering) without any union change. This is tried routinely and it may have some success in the short term or in some exceptional projects. However, this does not change the union and its way to integrate members (union democracy) and also not its political orientation. The 'real' union power does not increase if the essentials of MOC and framing are not met. Utilized only as *Sozialtechnik* success can only be achieved exceptionally or through the remaining institutional power – a power which is only granted and will be taken away sooner or later when the associational power declines.

Adrian Durtschi from the Swiss union UNIA described the problematic:

Organizing can be used simply as *Sozialtechnik* without political reorientation and union democratisation. Even if it is used with the goal of democratisation: As long as it is only applied in isolated projects or companies, nothing changes in the union (…) Organizing must go as a joined emancipatoric project through the whole union. Nowadays it is easy for a union to sedate empowered workers from organizing projects. We must give activists the possibility to decide, to learn in the union, to develop themself and to become active (express 5/2014) ³

As shown before union renewal is essential in historical periods of unions in trouble and decline. If they want to avoid renewal, the following is likely to be unions' future:

The experience of trade unions in several countries has shown that membership loss alone is not a sufficient condition for a union to become an organizing union. Defending the remaining influence, servicing of the remaining members, organizing the decline, insuring the own position - and waiting for better times (shift of anti-union climate, success of unions political arm in elections which fulfils union demands), are common behaviours in declining organisations. (Schwetz 2005:29)

The quotation is from my master thesis of 2005. Unfortunately this is still the orientation of the vast majority of German unionists.

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6. Summary and Conclusion

The elements of social movement theory and sources of union power presented here can be fruitfully incorporated by unions into organising campaigns and Strategic Corporate Campaigns (SCC).

Summarized:

Structural assessment (POS)
- Help understand the broad political and social context – map class interests and power structures
- Identify points for intervention and leverage
- Help identify suitable targets

Self analysis (MOC)
- An realistic assessment of resources needed and available
- A realistic assessment of the state of mobilising structures
- Organisational capability and readiness - internal power dynamics

Identity formation, building solidarity (Framing capability)
- Understand how union members see themselves and how they subjectively understand the issue
- Understand how to build widespread support and solidarity for collective action
- Anticipate divisions and prepare for employer/opposition responses

Power analysis
- What sources of power does the union have available to it in the current context (POS) and given the current MOC, and how can these be strengthened?

However, such an approach has implications for strategic research. It brings the subjects workers and the union back into the analytical framework.
- It means that researchers have to pay more attention to the systematic assessment of the work and community environments beyond their relation to the company (Political Opportunity Structure).
- They must also take a harder look at the capacity of their own organisation and identify missing elements needed (Mobilising and Organisational Capacity).
- In addition, they must think of a story that captures members and the active and responsive public (framing).
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